Guardian offers 4 Iranelection endgames

The Guardian’s four-option scenario, unlike the one of Time magazine I blogged about a couple of days ago, DOES have a Rafsanjani takeover as one of the options. As often is the case in the world of foreign affairs, the British MSM thinks more broadly than America’s.

Here’s the details:

1 - Happy ending
To widespread surprise, the hardline Guardian Council conducts a thorough recount of votes, as ordered by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and decides, amid much embarrassment, that there should be a new election. Mir Hossein Mousavi wins. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accepts defeat.

2 - Damp squib
The partial recount ordered by the Supreme Leader concludes Ahmadinejad won a clear victory, although by a narrower margin. Despite lingering suspicions of foul play, the opposition is forced to accept the verdict. Ahmadinejad, in bad odour with the Supreme Leader for provoking demonstrators, moderates his line on policy issues. Mousavi vows to fight again.

3 - Confrontation

The Guardian Council's partial vote recount and investigation into electoral fraud are rejected by the opposition. Demonstrations spread and intensify. Security forces respond with increasing force, … Purge of reformist leaders, intellectuals, students and journalists continues. Leaderless demos gradually peter out. Ahmadinejad steps up anti-western rhetoric. Resumed protests at a later date considered highly likely.

4 - A second revolution
An insider cabal of senior clerical and establishment conservatives challenges Khamenei and forces his resignation after a vote in the Assembly of Experts. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani is elected in his stead and orders an investigation into the actions of Ahmadinejad and other senior members of the regime. Hardliners rally round the president while reformists demand new elections. Amid growing instability, Iran's unique Islamic/secular system of governance appears in danger of collapse.

Not just the last one, but all four show a breadth of thought, and more anticipation of developments in Iran, than did Time.
Per Steve Clemons’ analysis in the Washington Note, No. 1 is off the table with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continuing to refer to President Ahmadinejad, while threatening a crackdown on further protest.

No. 2 is hardly more likely, so, we’re on to 3 and 4. A LOT of the clerical leadership is worried about No. 4’s last line, but, will anybody find an agreement along the first lines of No. 4 to make it work?

My suggestion is that the Council of Guardians gets expanded; Khamenei keeps his seat as “Supreme Leader Emeritus” and gets to name a friend or two of his. At the same time, Academy of Experts oversight is made clear.

Along with that, Ahmadinejad agrees to put Mousavi in his cabinet, as well as to, per No. 2, moderate himself a bit, at least. Mousavi and his backers agree — if he gets the foreign ministry, to keep a daily oversight on Ahmadinejad taking a more moderate stance, at least for public consumption, on foreign affairs.

What would be the result of this?

“Reform” in Iran would certainly get new window dressing, but little new actual work; appearances, not action. Mousavi would use the foreign ministry to gear up for his next presidential run. By that time, Rafsanjani would “ease” Khamenei out of his official emeritus position. And, albeit more subtly, Rafsanjani would, like Khamenei, engage in presidential kingmaking.

Shah mat!

(Note, late Saturday, US Central time, I will have some more analysis on these lines.)