The pseudoscience called Marxism — details of why it's pseudoscience

These thoughts have been posted on Twitter, left as comments on others blogs and websites, occasionally on my own, but have not been unified into one big piece for some time.

Time to rectify that.

Yes, Marxism is a pseudoscience.

NOT because it's within economics. Economics is a science, albeit arguably the least scientific of the social sciences, outside behavioral economics, which is actually doing some scientific, empirical work.

But it's a pseudoscience above all because it's based on a crappy philosophical theory that is pseudoscientific when edited, folded, spindled and mutilated to be the basis of a theory in ANY scientific field.

That crappy philosophy, of course, is Hegelian dialectic as developed by Fichte. The idea that one person presents an anthesis to another's idea? Yes, individual people work that way. The idea that waves of history operate in thesis-antithesis-synthesis? Bullshit. Bullshit as a philosophy let alone anything more.

First and behind this all is that it's wrong in being based on Continental idealism in general and German forms of that in particular. Just because all your nouns get capitalized doesn't make it profound when stated in English. (Sidebar: Perhaps this is why Marxism never got the same footing in the Anglosphere as on the Continent, and ditto for both areas of Europe's extensions. And, to the degree it did catch on, it has been through further filtrations beyond the original that have in general moved beyond even the likes of the Frankfurt School on the Continent.)

Second, Marxists, changing the "idealism" of Hegelian dialectic into "materialism" doesn't make it any sounder as a philosophical theory or any less pseudoscientific when used as the basis for any scientific theory.

Marxist, and Hegelian, dialectic, are both pseudoscientific, or worse. Really, per Wolfgang Pauli, it's "not even wrong."

In addition, Fichte somewhat, and Marx even more, seemed to be guided by 19th century positivism, which is also not even wrong. Positivism is, by and large, a direct forerunner of today's scientism, which is also not even wrong. And, even to the degree it might be true in the "hard" sciences, while I laud behavioral economics, individual as opposed to group behavior will never reduce to positivistic laws in economics or other social sciences.

Positivism, and the scientism that follows on it also has another fatal error embedded within it. As the likes of Steven Pinker today show, both operate from a progress-based theory of history, perhaps fueled by seeing evolution, as put on a scientific footing by Darwin, as progress-based. (Just as he generally, though not always fully, rejected Social Darwinism, so did Darwin respond to would-be progress-theory interpreters of evolution.)

And, the classical economics with which Marx was trying to work? Beyond its general assumption of a rational homo economicus, which behavioral economics has crushed to death, it's ultimately based on Adam Smith's Age of Enlightenment era idea of a "wind up the universe like clockwork" Deist divinity's "rational hand" guiding all.

Uhh, no.

And, no, Smithians, while you're here, the claim that the rational hand is NOT Deist theology at end is untrue. I've blogged about that before, too, and there's clear traces in Smith.

So, while economics today isn't pseudoscience, one can argue that it was 150 years ago, and that Marxism is therefore pseudoscience squared.

I do want to thank Andrew Stewart of Washington Babylon, on Twitter, for prodding me to put this together, starting with my disagreement with his take on the 1619 Project, as noted in my update to my original piece. And I could tell it was Stew, not Ken Silverstein, by the first response.

As to the claim behind our Twitter back-and-forth that was the final impetus for this piece?

Uhh, no, not all racism issues, not even in modern, capitalist times, reduce to socioeconomic class ones. I told Stew that and provided links from this blog — stuff that led to me and Doug Henwood arguing and him eventually blocking my old primary Twitter account. (The likely last straw for Henwood, per that second link, was me saying Reed was either mendacious or an idiot when he called New Mexico one of the whitest states in the nation.)

Let me go further, though.

Empirical counterexamples are always the best final weapon for undercutting bad theory, and I have two from today.

Two instances of how racism indeed affects social class, but, although it might have indirect effects on economic standing, does not directly focus on economic standing let alone directly target it.

This Marxism I fully endorse!

I'm taking about the race-essentialist Zionism that drives not only the Likud bloc but almost all political thinking in Israel and the Indian caste system, that, cross-pollinated with Islamophobia, is seeing a resurgence as we speak in India from the BJP and its Hindutva allies.

And old Chinese racism against Europeans pre-dates European forms of modern capitalism (but don't forget that China invented paper money way back in the Tang Dynasty!) and was culturally based.

And, I know Stew knows (or should know) all of this, though he, Henwood, Adolph Reed and others would likely differ in interpretation. That's their problem, not mine.

I am some sort of socialist. I might even become some sort of pre- or post-Marxist Communist some day, though I doubt it. I'll never be a Marxist, though.

Related to that? I am, in a small bit, some sort of post-capitalist. Anti-capitalist, though? Never. That's in part because that phrasing might imply support for the Marxist dialectical system.

Now, that said, I know that many people call themselves "Marxists" as a signifier of generic social rebellion, or a generic protest against capitalism or other things. In other words, many people think "Marxist" has a certain je ne sais quoi, from what I can tell.

Sloppy usage is not excused at this site, though.

If you're an anarchist anti-capitalist, but not actually a Marxist, then call yourself an anarchist. Ditto if there's some other "ism" you fit into more than Marxism.

==

I have gotten strong push-back on Twitter from friendly fire!

The biggest objection is that Marxism as a theory is political philosophy, and thus not a science. I content that it was established as a theory of economics first and foremost and that economics is a social science, ergo, like any other social or hard science, the theoretical framework as well as individual experimental or other allegedly empirical elements can be examined to see whether they're pseudoscience or not.

Erik Weissengruber accepted my premise, but said that, on the actual empirical / experimental side, Marxism actually was panning out. That said, that piece is predicated on the labor theory of value being true.

Per Wiki, there's the additional issue, and I stand partially guilty on Twitter responses, that Marxian economics can stand separate of Marxism.

So, as I update, and incorporate thoughts from others on Twitter, and what they provoke within me, I will work to focus on Marxism the big picture, not Marxian economics. Besides, to the degree I hold fast and prove fast that Marxism is pseudoscience, the economics falls with it, ultimately. And, somewhat contra Wiki (and referencing a goal of mine to use Zionism peddler Jimmy Wales' site less and less), even among more heterodox (from Marxism) Marxian economists, I don't think it can stand TOO independent of Marxism. I mean, this week's Existential Comics from Corey overlaps Marxism and Marxian economics. Those who claim it can, per my note at the tail end of the original post, are probably using the word "Marxism" too loosely.

First, Marxism is more than political philosophy. And I know that philosophers always get nervous about scientific turf-field creepage. But, political science is a science, a social science. And, history is at least halfway between the humanities and the social sciences.

So, I think it's a legitimate critical essay to call Marxism pseudoscience, and not just individual outshoots of it, like the labor theory of value in Marxist hands.

If one doesn't accept that political science is an actual social science, then we're at a linguistic-usage fork in the road. And, by the time of Marx's death, per the history of the field, I think we can distinguish political science from older political philosophy. Per my reference to positivism, I think people like Marx were making a conscious effort for that distinguishing.

And, at the same time, re my friendly critics, I have talked in the past about "philosophism" as a philosophy-driven counterpart to scientism.

The real edginess of The Edge and John Brockman

The Edge Foundation is well known to science and philosophy fanbois and fangrrlz, including myself, with its big "annual question" that founder and proprietor John Brockman asks leading philosophers and scientists.

But, there's also a private version.

And there's plenty of story behind that.

Evgeny Morozov calls it "an elaborate massage of the ego (and apparently much else) for the rich, the smart, and the powerful."

Turns out there's a horrible pun of sorts in that material in parentheses.

In the article, Morozov drops the reveal on just how much of a "FOJ" Brockman is. That would be as in "Friend of Jeffrey," with the Jeffrey being Jeffrey Epstein. And there's your horrible, and horribly true, in all likelihood, pun.

Brockman is also a heavy hitter in the book agency world for science authors. THAT now explains, I think, the Lawrence Krauss connection with Epstein.

Morozov explains:

Epstein participated in the Edge Foundation’s annual questions, and attended its “billionaires’ dinners.” Brockman may also be the reason why so many prominent academics—from Steven Pinker to Daniel Dennett—have found themselves answering awkward questions about their associations with Epstein; they are clients of Brockman. Marvin Minsky, the prominent MIT scientist who surfaced as one of Epstein’s island buddies? A client of Brockman’s. Joi Ito, the director of the elite research facility MIT Media Lab, who has recently acknowledged extensive ties to Epstein? Also, a client of Brockman’s.

So, Krauss, infamous for his own Epstein connections, was either an imperial playtoy at one of these dinners, a Brockman agency client, or both. (That "prominent academics" link makes clear Krauss was invited to one of the shindigs, if nothing else.)

This, in turn leads to further issues.

Krauss was also the recipient of one of Epstein's grants to theoretically creative scientists.

And, the Slate piece that Morozov links in that pull-quote above points up more of the Epstein problem. He has almost exclusively courted male scientists with his grant funding. That, in turn, beyond its relationship to sexual procurement, is a clear promotion of sexism in science. That may not be on Brockman, but even it kind of is, even if he didn't know about Epstein's hideous sexual abuse. That said, people whom Brockman invited to participate on the public version of The Edge were almost all men, too.

Speaking of, I've long considered Ev Psych sexist, what with its bragging about man (the male) as the "noble hunter gatherer," ignoring aeons of the male as the less noble, and female assisted, scavenger gatherer, along with the pseudoscience of the EEA and other things.

Well, re Epstein, and re many of the writers in Brockman's stable, somebody's nailed the coonskin to the wall on Epstein's love of Ev Psychers.  Robert Trivers and Steve Pinker are among the name checked, but here's the money quote:

Of all academic disciplines, evolutionary psychology has the most to do with pussy.

And, I'm reminded that the douche, Pinker, defended the indefensible, and pseudoscience squared, "A Natural History of Rape." Alexandra Walling also notes Pinker's comments about rapists elsewhere, as in criminal rape cases today, and how they don't square with him defending Thornhill let alone dodging Epstein's connections with silence.

And, puhleeze, ev psych fanbois AND fangrllz, don't send me names of women in ev psych, make claims about it that aren't true or are scientism based, etc.

Beyond that, I thought the "great question" on the public version of The Edge often bordered on pretentiousness. Many of them recycled themselves. And, a number of them were at least partially connected to ... ev psych.

It seems that John Brockman's greatest sales job has been selling himself.

And, maybe, by silence, he's trying to sell scientists and philosopher clients, or at least the fans, that he's not connected to Epstein.

Morozov said he'd like to believe otherwise himself:

When the Epstein-Brockman connection first surfaced in the news, I wanted to give Brockman the benefit of the doubt. ... In the last few weeks, such a charitable interpretation has become very hard to sustain, especially as other details ... became public. John Brockman has not said a word publicly about his connection to Epstein since the latest scandal broke, preferring to maintain silence on the matter. That I have found quite infuriating.

Morozov then personalizes why he finds this infuriating. He said he got an email from Brockman in 2013, intended for somebody else. They had a back and forth and Morozov makes this observation, aided to some degree by hindsight, as he says that, years ago, he didn't know who Epstein was (born in Belarus, I have no doubt on that):

In that old email, it seems clear that Brockman was acting as Epstein’s PR man.

There you go. And, 2013 was after Epstein's original conviction, of course. He expands:

(N)ow that I’ve found that old email he sent me, I cannot believe that he knew absolutely nothing of Epstein’s wild sexual escapades—in fact, his email suggests he was trying to capitalize on them to recruit yet another useful idiot into Epstein’s network.

OK, that's that.

Morozov has decided to act.

I’m just one of the many authors in Brockman’s agency; my departure wouldn’t affect anything. I am also the last one to complain: His agency sold two of my books, and I have two more underway, also sold by them. 

Yet, I am ready to pull the plug on my association with Brockman’s agency—and would encourage other authors to consider doing the same—until and unless he clarifies the relationship between him, the Edge Foundation, and Epstein. If such an explanation is not forthcoming, many of us will have to decide whether we would like to be part of this odd intellectual club located on the dubious continuum between the seminar room and a sex-trafficking ring.

Sounds reasonable enough and straightforward enough.

So, after reading this, I Tweeted the link to two online friends of mine, philosopher and philosopher of science Massimo Pigliucci, and science journalism professor John Horgan.

Let's just say I found Horgan's response "interesting":

Brockman ceased being my agent a decade ago, but I'm not going to speak ill of him. And Morozov is a rat jumping off a ship he thinks is sinking.

— John Horgan (@Horganism) August 22, 2019

I don't think I'm at "infuriating," but beyond the scare-quoted, not reference-quoted, "interesting," I find his response more than "interesting." 

"Defensive" was the first word that came to my mind.

I've followed Morozov semi-regularly for several years, ever since the late Leo Lincourt turned me on to him. His "solutionism," the idea that modern technology, including and usually above all the social media world, claims to have "the answer" for social problems of all sorts, is mirrored in my blog label "salvific technologism."

Morozov was born in Belarus. I think that, having seen bits of the communist cum state capitalism version of Brockman's hedonic capitalism may be part of what put Morozov off. Maybe what he saw as pretentiousness was an additional factor — and pretentiousness among Brockman's Roman Senate lackeys at the court of Caligula (with Brockman kind of a Wizard of Oz behind Epstein's Caligula, to complete the analogy).

And his answer to his rhetorical question is no:

In Brockman’s world, billionaires, scientists, artists, novelists, journalists, and musicians all blend together to produce enormous value — for each other and, of course, for Brockman. This mingling of clients doesn’t happen in other literary agencies, at least not to this extent. Nor does this happen at Brockman Inc., as all such interactions that we know of took place under the umbrella of the Edge Foundation, a sibling organization, with Brockman as its president. Would Brockman Inc. exist without the Edge Foundation? Possibly—and it did, at the outset. Would it be as powerful, trading on Brockman’s ability to rub shoulders with academics and billionaires alike? Probably not. Still, I can attest that Brockman’s authors face no pressure to get involved with Edge: I, for example, diligently responded to their annual questions between 2010 and 2013—and then stopped, as I was put off by Brockman’s insistence that people responding to the annual question should keep away from politics.

So ... Dennett, Pinker and many others, even if, unlike Krauss, they have never had anything besides their egos massaged, have been at least partial accomplices in having Brockman's ego massaged through silence. That's Morozov's take. 

I personally found the Edge big questions, even before it dawned on me now that they were largely repetitive and recycled, to be pretentious in the answering thereof. That partially dovetails with Morozov's take. There was a degree of scientism in some answers, too, and maybe even philosophism from a few philosophers.

The final issue is Morozov's call for action.

Whether the ship is sinking or not, I don't think he's a rat, if there's any pejorative angle to John saying that.

Rather, the ship seems to be captained by a rat. Whether or not Morozov has Brockman as his agent at this time, which Horgan does not, he has an ethically honest stance. It's basically a call to boycott Brockman, at least as an agent.

I just think Morozov should go further. I think that, until Brockman not only clarifies those relationships, but to the degree needed, offers an apology, any remnants of The Edge ought to be boycotted, not just Brockman's agency. (The Edge is in a sort of limbo, or something; it had no 2019 Big Question.)

Also going beyond Morozov, I think Brockman needs to address the issue of sexism in being a science book agent, as I noted above.

And, turns out many science foundations, research agencies, etc., not just individual scientists, all got money from Epstein and many are refusing to comment.

GIVE THE MONEY TO CHARITY! Like an anti-sexual trafficking organization!

===

Via Twitter, Morozov also reminds me of pseudoskeptic grifter Al Seckel's connection to Epstein.

Still surprised by how little attention the Epstein-chasing media have paid to Al Seckel - a top-notch charlatan, a one-time TED Talker, a member of the Edge community, an ex-husband of Ghislaine Maxwell's sister, and a co-organizer (with Epstein) of the Mindshift conference.

— Evgeny Morozov (@evgenymorozov) September 6, 2019

Jim Lippard years ago noted this.

Lippard and Tom McIver, via Tweets, reinforce that Brockman was an enabler for Epstein.

John Brockman knew. Here he is with one of Jeffrey Epstein’s rape victims on one side, and alleged abuse coordinator, at an https://t.co/oEYOr4yISa billionaire’s dinner in the early 2000s. pic.twitter.com/dwm6UJhe9r

— Xeni Jardin (@xeni) August 24, 2019

And, to complete the circle, Seckel was an Edge member.

There's also this:

Why is Jeffrey Epstein's association with John Brockman's Edge Group touted in numerous spam blogs?

— Jim Lippard (@lippard) January 5, 2011

That would seem to be answered here.

This all said, while movement skepticism, or Skeptics™, doesn't have a sexual assault problem, as anybody who knows the history of skepticism organizations, conferences and events knows, like Center for Inquiry, it's got a HUGE past history of sexual harassment. Are there other connections to at least Brockman, if not Epstein?

Respectful note to John Horgan — I think you need to rethink your attitude toward Morozov and the "rats." There's only one (still-living) rat in this equation.

What color are these strawberries is ultimately a philosophical question, not scientific

A lot of people have probably, via Facebook friends or whatever, seen the photo of strawberries at left, whose production is described here.

I haven't actually opened the picture in Photoshop, but I'll take at face value the claim it has no red pixels.

But, what does that actually mean?

Photoshop's default on color pictures is to present a photo in "RGB" format. That's Red, Green, and Blue — the three primary colors. But, many Photoshop commands let one manipulate not only those three colors, but the three commonly accepted secondary colors of Cyan, Magenta and Yellow, plus a channel for Black. If you've ever heard of CMYK (B already used for Blue) photo editing, that's where it comes from. The Black channel is necessitated by the conversion of primary colors back to secondary.

Anyway, back to RGB colors. Several thoughts here.

First, many colors, even in "normal lighting," whatever that is, aren't what we think. If you use Photoshop much, you'll see that the "green" in grass is about one-third yellow.

Second, does Photoshop's 256-level format (two to the eighth power of bits on eight-bit basis) for each color channel imply a level of digital accuracy that doesn't exist? I mean, we can peg light to 500 nanometers. But, is that blue or is that cyan, or turquoise, if we use a non-technical color, or what? Wiki has a full piece on "spectral color" which raises such issues.

And, with that, we're into various issues of philosophy.

Setting aside some aspects of epistemology, we've got what would be either informal logic or linguistic philosophy, first. That is the issue of categories and definitions.

Per what I posted above, where does one color "stop" and another "begin"? That's not a science issue, that's a philosophy issue.

We also have linguistic philosophy issues on how one defines color. Setting aside the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which is nonetheless of a certain degree of strength, some languages distinguish between more colors than others. Isaac Newton, with the rainbows produced by his prism, famously distinguished indigo as a seventh color of the spectrum.

To the degree the above photo is an optical illusion, it trades on something else which is related to epistemology, and to David Hume's project of empiricism. That is the idea of qualia, or why do things seem to be the way they are.

The idea of qualia, if accepted in one of its several forms and definings, undercuts the "blank slate" idea of human perception stressed by Hume, and to fair degree by fellow empiricists. A child old enough to point to a red splotch in normal light, when shown this picture above, would not be able to point to claim it has a color similar to that red splotch on the blank slate theory of the human mind. (I frame the example this way to try to bracket the issue of the baby's mind being "contaminated" by explicit written or oral conversation.)

As to opponents of the idea of qualia? As I've gotten older, and more read in modern philosophy, I find Dan Dennett's arguments more and more lacking. The more and more we do current research in robots, artificial intelligence and similar, the more and more we realize human minds don't work that way. Dennett's other objections are somewhat functionalist in nature.

A side issue is that discussions of qualia often get wrapped up with issues of ontological dualism, even though in reality the two are separate items.

===

Or IS it ultimately a philosophical, not a scientific, question?

Nature painting by tetrachromat Concetta Antico

After all, the issue of color persistence, which is at the heart of the illusion, is a scientific issue, not a philosophical one. So is the related issue of the structure and operation of the human eye's cone cells. And, just as Nelson Goodman's "grue" is a philosophical question, special glasses that can make people see tetrachromatically (allegedly) are scientific issues — even if the fourth "primary color" might be something they wind up calling "grue." Beyond glasses, natural tetrachromatic people are already here, albeit a small minority, and one quite hard to identify — and self-identify —, which puts back to the issue of philosophy.

Per what I said above about a lot of green in Photoshop actually being yellow, I can see, looking at her paintings, how tetrachromat Antico, at the link above (learn more about her at her website), has her fourth cone cells tuned to somewhere between red and green (which actually shades to a yellowish-green in most people anyway).

Bottom line?

We mustn't steer away from the ditch of scientism only to drive into the other ditch of philosophism.

Nor can we consider many scientific questions outside of philosophy.

On the other hand, we also can't consider many philosophy questions outside of science. Philosophers fear, often rightly, "poaching" on their territory by the science world. On the other hand, in many issues related to consciousness, volition and other matters of the human mind, philosophers all too often remain resistant to legitimate claims of neuroscience and related fields.

Is the concept of god outside of science?

David Ottlinger, a former philosophy prof on a personal sabbatical, says yes. 

I say no. And, I offer a no that isn’t a scientism-based no.

First, I have to respectively disagree with Ottlinger on how we define the "sciences." I count the social sciences as sciences. If anything, it seems to be quasi-scientism to claim they’re not.

And, I'll also have to respectively disagree with the details of why we disagree. Psychology is becoming more scientific, through folks such as Kahnemann, Ariely, et al, on a regular basis, as far as gathering empirical data, analyzing it, and constructing theories. And, of course, evolutionary psychology — done correctly! — is just the fusion of this with evolutionary biology. Evolutionary anthropology is a similar fusion with cultural anthropology.

There are differences, of course.

For example, to go to history, now that I've touched on psychology and anthropology, and indirectly on sociology.

Historic events are multi-causal, of course. There was no "one" cause (and even no "three" causes) of, say, the American Revolution. And, historians will disagree which of those causes to weight more. But, history can and does conclusively rule out that, say, Manchu China had any causal contribution to the American Revolution.

Therefore, this:

Arguments modeled on science tend to fail because they do not appreciate the subtleties of the concepts and the ambiguities of implication.

Is precisely how the social sciences, at their best, are both social and scientific, because they appreciate the subtleties of concepts involved, but still bring a scientific eye to bear as much as possible.

To be specific, evolutionary psychology ideas of things like pattern detectors and agency imputers being part of the basis of religious evolution, even if ev psych can never meet provability hurdles of modern psychology, do seem reasonable and fit with what we know about human mental development.

While said social sciences can't provide "the answers" on this issue, they certainly can — and, in my opinion, should — "inform" philosophy.

Hence, my "philosophism" tag, for attempting to unduly exclude the sciences from this issue.

The opposite of "scientism" is???

I have had no problem labeling the thought processes of people like P.Z. Myers and Sam Harris with the tag of "scientism" at times when it was clear they were trying to address nonscientific issues from a scientific point of view. Especially with Harris, allegedly a philosopher because he has a degree in the subject, it's frustrating, off-putting, undercuts the "cause" of secularism and more.

Philosopher Massimo Pigliucci also has no problem pegging people like that.

So, it's a bit disconcerting when he says social science research into people's moral judgment thinking not only is not philosophy, but that it can't even lead to philosophy, in his perspective.

And, so, I ask, the opposite of scientism, in this case, is ...

"Philosophism"?

His argument, in a nutshell, is in a comment of his near the end of the comment thread:

Similarly, we evolved the ability to make moral judgment, but that doesn't begin to equip us for professional-level moral reasoning ...

I saw "professional-level moral reasoning," which I inadvertently shortened to "professional moral reasoning" (though I don't think that significantly changed anything) and ... well, I cringed.

It's like Massimo wants to do data-free, research-free philosophy. And, even if (I'm not going to say "even though") he may not have meant it in an elitist way, it sure comes off that way, which is the main reason I cringed.