SocraticGadfly: Rafsanjani (Akbar)
Showing posts with label Rafsanjani (Akbar). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rafsanjani (Akbar). Show all posts

December 25, 2009

Rafsanjani caught in middle in Iran

Near the end of his column on the most recent Iranian protests, Juan Cole notes that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani deplores the tough governmental crackdown on those protests, but at the same time, things the protests are moving too quickly. How much longer can he straddle the middle, especially if the protests keep up their energy?

August 15, 2009

Mousavi forms new ‘popular front’ political movement

Up until recently, over the last few weeks, defeated Iranian presidential candidate Mir Mousavi has been pretty quiet.

No longer. He has formed a new political movement, “The Green Path of Hope.” What the story doesn’t mention, though, is what has me most curious – will this light a fire under Grand Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani to do more in opposition to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, or not?

August 14, 2009

Former Iran lawmakers want to investigate Khamenei

This is big news. A group of reform-minded former Iranian lawmakers want to “investigate Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the aftermath of the country’s June 12 presidential election, including allegations arrested dissidents have been tortured.

Showing how serious they are, their letter calling for the investigation calls Kahrizak prison worse than Abu Ghraib.

Their letter has been addressed to Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who heads the Assembly of Experts, but it’s unlikely he could ramrod such an action through there.
-END-

July 21, 2009

‘People revolution’ – Rafsanjani translated

Based on reaction inside Tehran, it seems Grand Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani spoke elliptically enough, but not too elliptically, at Friday prayers.

July 17, 2009

Rafsanjani speech, his tactics, Iran resistance

With Iranian police engaging in “preventative detention” arrests even before Grand Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani’s speech at noon prayers Friday in Tehran, future installations of trouble were guaranteed. But, given that papers like the LA Times got anonymous Iranians to contribute to their stories, in addition to what Rafsanjani actually said to challenge the government, guarantees that the resistance will continue.

At the same time, I’d like to hear more on any guess as to Rafsanjani’s angle. Sure, he’d like to replace Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Sure, that’s obvious enough that many backers of presidential challenger Mir Mousavi don’t trust him.

But, in particular, with his calls for mediation by the Assembly of Experts, on the tactical level, what game is he running right now?

Rafsanjani walks fine line but rebukes Iran govt

Grand Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani, without directly questioning the June Iran election results, nonetheless called those results a “crisis,” while also publicly criticizing the Guardian Council backstopping Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He then said he had discussed a possible solution with members of the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts; he heads both.

However, as I’ve blogged ever since the “official” election results were announced, Rafsanjani is an opportunist. And, as the LA Times notes, many Mousavi backers agree.

More detailed information when available.

July 16, 2009

Rafsanjani to lead Iran Friday prayers

Grand Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani, spiritual patron of Iranian presidential candidate Mir Mousavi will lead Friday prayers at Tehran University.

Add in the fact that Mousavi will attend.

Boy, you talk about a situation with potential for about anything to happen.

Meanwhile, just because you don’t hear about resistance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad doesn’t mean it isn’t happening:
Passive resistance includes trying to crash the electricity grid by turning on home appliances at appointed times and creating power surges, or stuffing newspapers into Islamic charity boxes reputed to contribute to the upkeep of ideological militias involved in suppressing the protests.

Meanwhile, as the Wall Street Journal notes and I have blogged before, who knows what “the cynical operator” Rafsanjani will even say? He’s not going to do anything overt or stupid, but a crowd looking to parse every subtle inflection could get ideas.

June 22, 2009

Rafsanjani says elminate Supreme Leader – his angle

If the. report out of Saudi Arabia is true, this is big. A collective body instead of the one person would, to some degree, repudiate Ayatollah Khoumeni’s original model for Iran as an Islamic Republic, would it not?

And, that said, the “consultative body”? Uhh, well, that would most likely be the
Assembly of Experts, which he heads.

Very good, on the political angle.

June 21, 2009

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: A profile and his angle

The place to start is Rafsanjani’s Wiki page, which show a long-term political insider — former President; before that, former Majlis chairman during Reagan’s nutbar “arms for hostages” idea, and current chairman of the Assembly of Experts, which appoints people to the Council of Guardians. The Wiki page also reveals a variety of quotes, that bring under further question just how much of a reformer, a pragmatist, or a non-confrontationist vis-à-vis the US he actually is. Here’s one:
f one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Of course, you can see that the Americans have kept their eyes peeled and they are carefully looking for even the slightest hint that technological advances are being made by an independent Islamic country. If an independent Islamic country is thinking about acquiring other kinds of weaponry, then they will do their utmost to prevent it from acquiring them. Well, that is something that almost the entire world is discussing right now. (December 2001

While that occurred after George W. Bush became President of the U.S., it was before Iran was labeled part of an “axis of evil,” while Iran was cooperating with the U.S. in Afghanistan, and long before the invasion of Iraq.

Second as the Guardian notes, his 1989-97 presidency was NOT seen as close to a model of toleration by many Iranians. With nicknames like “kingmaker,” “shark” and “Machiavellian,” it’s clear his various electoral positions reflect his skill as an infighter.

Yesterday, I blogged about four endgames for the Iranian post-election turmoil, as listed by The Guardian The fourth of these, as you can see:
3 - Confrontation
The Guardian Council's partial vote recount and investigation into electoral fraud are rejected by the opposition. Demonstrations spread and intensify. Security forces respond with increasing force, … Purge of reformist leaders, intellectuals, students and journalists continues. Leaderless demos gradually peter out. Ahmadinejad steps up anti-western rhetoric. Resumed protests at a later date considered highly likely.

4 - A second revolution
An insider cabal of senior clerical and establishment conservatives challenges Khamenei and forces his resignation after a vote in the Assembly of Experts. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani is elected in his stead and orders an investigation into the actions of Ahmadinejad and other senior members of the regime. Hardliners rally round the president while reformists demand new elections. Amid growing instability, Iran's unique Islamic/secular system of governance appears in danger of collapse.

Is Rafsanjani replacing Khamenei, even while Ahmadinejad remains president.

I’ve said before that I see a Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad deal as a possibility, even though Ahmadinejad leveled corruption charged at Rafsanjani during the election. Given the fluidity of definition of “moderate” (and the Sully-Cole grouping here in America sounding more and more like Ronald Reagan, circa 1985-86), deals are possible all across the Iranian spectrum.

Here, Iran strikes me as being kind of like Nazi Germany minus Hitler at the top. Many competing power centers, with the Council of Guardians the highest, but by no means having a power stranglehold. (While the Council, and the Supreme Leader, are the highest, they’re by no means the sole lever of power.)

That’s another reason why power deals seem possible across a variety of political orientations.

Here’s another: Rather than booting Khamenei upstairs to Supreme Leader Emeritus, maybe Rafsanjani offers him the face-saver of swapping jobs, by him taking Rafsanjani’s spot on the Assembly of Experts.

June 20, 2009

Time: Four endgames on Iran misses No. 5

Time has a thought-provoking speculative article four ways the Iranian political tussle could play out. It rightly notes none of the main actors want to destroy Iran’s current political structure, for example.

But, it misses option No. 5.

That would be for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former President Akbar Rafsanjani to cut a deal behind the backs of both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and opposition presidential candidate Mir Mousavi.

Ahmadinejad has no particular loyalty to Khamenei, despite the latter’s pre-election quasi-endorsement of him. Rafsanjani has no special loyalty that I know of to Mousavi; rather, I think he’s just seen him as a stalking horse to his goal of unseating Khamenei.

If the two can line up enough support among both the Council of Guardians and the Academy of Experts, Ahmadinejad has control of the Basij to nullify any lingering Mousavi street protests after Rafsanjani sells him down the river.

Amnyay, take a look at the Time story and judge for yourself if a scenario like mine is plausible, then, if it is that likely.

Update: True, Ahmadinejad attacked Rafsanjani during the election, over his foreign policy as well as alleged opulence. But, politics can always make strange bedfellows. And, I don’t think I”ve yet exhausted the possibilities.

Rafsanjani might cut a deal with Khamenei, for that matter, that could involve a new election, or other possibilities.

To use an old foreign policy word, I think the situation in Iran is very “fluid” right now.

From comments, “uninformed” shows he’s anything but:
I agree that there are more than 4 possible scenarios. Another, real possibility, is Mousavi and Rafsanjani simply back down. I think both have too much too lose in a full scale revolt. A sick variant of this, is this was the plan all along. An agreement to reform, but only after the revolutionary element could be weeded out from the reform camp. Mousavi publicly distances himself from those who revolt, leaving a smaller group isolated, allowing the government to cull them. After the dust settles, the 2 major and 2 minor players "mend" fences.

Definitely agree these are all possibilities.

Also agree that the four major/semi-major players probably would like to at least be started on a resolution process by Monday.

Update: The Guardian’s four-option scenario, though DOES have a Rafsanjani takeover as one of the options. As often is the case in the world of foreign affairs, the British MSM thinks more broadly than America’s.

Guardian offers 4 Iranelection endgames

The Guardian’s four-option scenario, unlike the one of Time magazine I blogged about a couple of days ago, DOES have a Rafsanjani takeover as one of the options. As often is the case in the world of foreign affairs, the British MSM thinks more broadly than America’s.

Here’s the details:
1 - Happy ending
To widespread surprise, the hardline Guardian Council conducts a thorough recount of votes, as ordered by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and decides, amid much embarrassment, that there should be a new election. Mir Hossein Mousavi wins. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accepts defeat.

2 - Damp squib
The partial recount ordered by the Supreme Leader concludes Ahmadinejad won a clear victory, although by a narrower margin. Despite lingering suspicions of foul play, the opposition is forced to accept the verdict. Ahmadinejad, in bad odour with the Supreme Leader for provoking demonstrators, moderates his line on policy issues. Mousavi vows to fight again.

3 - Confrontation

The Guardian Council's partial vote recount and investigation into electoral fraud are rejected by the opposition. Demonstrations spread and intensify. Security forces respond with increasing force, … Purge of reformist leaders, intellectuals, students and journalists continues. Leaderless demos gradually peter out. Ahmadinejad steps up anti-western rhetoric. Resumed protests at a later date considered highly likely.

4 - A second revolution
An insider cabal of senior clerical and establishment conservatives challenges Khamenei and forces his resignation after a vote in the Assembly of Experts. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani is elected in his stead and orders an investigation into the actions of Ahmadinejad and other senior members of the regime. Hardliners rally round the president while reformists demand new elections. Amid growing instability, Iran's unique Islamic/secular system of governance appears in danger of collapse.

Not just the last one, but all four show a breadth of thought, and more anticipation of developments in Iran, than did Time.
Per Steve Clemons’ analysis in the Washington Note, No. 1 is off the table with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continuing to refer to President Ahmadinejad, while threatening a crackdown on further protest.

No. 2 is hardly more likely, so, we’re on to 3 and 4. A LOT of the clerical leadership is worried about No. 4’s last line, but, will anybody find an agreement along the first lines of No. 4 to make it work?

My suggestion is that the Council of Guardians gets expanded; Khamenei keeps his seat as “Supreme Leader Emeritus” and gets to name a friend or two of his. At the same time, Academy of Experts oversight is made clear.

Along with that, Ahmadinejad agrees to put Mousavi in his cabinet, as well as to, per No. 2, moderate himself a bit, at least. Mousavi and his backers agree — if he gets the foreign ministry, to keep a daily oversight on Ahmadinejad taking a more moderate stance, at least for public consumption, on foreign affairs.

What would be the result of this?

“Reform” in Iran would certainly get new window dressing, but little new actual work; appearances, not action. Mousavi would use the foreign ministry to gear up for his next presidential run. By that time, Rafsanjani would “ease” Khamenei out of his official emeritus position. And, albeit more subtly, Rafsanjani would, like Khamenei, engage in presidential kingmaking.

Shah mat!

(Note, late Saturday, US Central time, I will have some more analysis on these lines.)

June 19, 2009

Khamenei charges Rafsanjani corruption not true?

The NYT buries what is a key portion of its story on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s reaction to protests over the Iran presidential election, and buries it at the bottom story.

But, it confirms what I’ve been saying for a week.

By Khamenei raising the issue of former President Akbar Rafsanjani, his rival to take over as Supreme Leader of Iran, and corruption, even if to deny it the Gray Lady makes clear this is ultimately not about the presidential election, but beyond that.

And, if members of his family are being detained, too, the crackdown is spreading.

‘Mousavi is the Obama of Iran’ – do jokes abound?

So claims Iranian filmmaker and Mir Mousavi spokesman Mohsen Makhmalbaf, who compares Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to George W. Bush.

Is this an “insert joke here” moment? Or, an “irony alert” moment? If enough of Mousavi’s “rallies” are actually controlled by Ayatollah Akbar Rafsanjani, then actually Mousavi is in the position of George W. Bush, December 2000.

And, for Makhmalbaf to claim Ahmadinejad’s 2005 election (also) had massive fraud? Let’s not forget that it was Ahmadinejad vs. Rafsanjani in the final runoff in 2005.

So, again, behind Mousavi, arguably, we have the voice of Rafsanjani.

Back to the more humorous side, I suppose real reformers in Iran, and real liberals in the U.S., might actually agree with Makhmalbaf’s comparison, namely how close to each other the political leaders in the two countries actually are on many issues.

June 18, 2009

Excellent breakout of Iran’s political background

Again, not coming from a wide-eyed person here in the U.S., but from Dieter Bednarz at Der Spiegel. He, as have I in previous blog posts, focuses on the Khamenei-Rafsanjani square-off, as the key to what’s happening now.

Also contra wide-eyed Juan Cole and Andrew Sullivan claims of vote fraud, when Mir Mousavi claims not just that he won, but that he got nearly 70 percent of the vote, he comes off as just as unbelievable as any other battlers in the current Iranian political scene. And, Cole and Sully continue to lose credibility the longer they continue to keep Mousavi on any sort of pedestal, even if a small one, and the longer they ignore Rafsanjani’s camel’s nose in the tent.

June 16, 2009

Yet more on Iran’s Rafsanjani angle

At The New Republic, Robert Baer says President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s attacks on former President (and ayatollah) Akbar Rafsanjani were certainly at the instigation of Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. That said, I think Baer overstates another item when he claims Iran is a military dictatorship and not a theocracy.

Yes, Khamenei may be a Cracker Jack or mail-order ayatollah, but he is one, and he heads a council of ayatollahs and other religious jurists that are Iran’s ultimate power source. It also seems to me that he’s trying to put lipstick on the pigs (non-halal bad pun warning!) of both Rafsanjani and opposition presidential candidate Mir Mousavi (indirectly).

So, while I critiqued Obama’s press statement yesterday as “blah, blah, blah,” nonetheless he’s probably right not to prematurely commit to one side in an internecine and even Byzantine power struggle inside Iran. (That said, his noncommittal yesterday WAS “blah, blah, blah.”

If Rafsanjani is meddling in Iran, why?

Yesterday, I blogged here and here that former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani might be playing both ends against the middle in the discord and violence after Iran’s just-completed presidential election in an attempt to replace Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as head of the Council of Guardians

It certainly is a possibility. That said, did he set out to do this? I doubt it. But, opportunists usually have the biggest success in politics, as Napoleon said in other words.

As for the why?

I think Rafsanjani has had his eye on Khamenei’s seat for some time. Maybe he thinks he can’t get it by a democratic (within the Council) ousting of Khamenei while he’s still alive. And, since Rafsanjani is five years older, he can't he can’t afford to try to outwait Khamenei.

As for America’s best interests, since Rafsanjani is a former president, too, it might actually be WORSE for him to replace Khamanei.

June 15, 2009

Rafsanjani – playing both ends against middle in Iran?

This news story spells out the bottom line about who really might have the most to gain in Iranian post-election dissent, with this blog post by Allahpundit providing a very good big picture and background rundown. The real winner in this could be Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who, if the chips fall right, could replace Khamenei. That said “moderate seeing” Americans of today, no less than the Bud McFarlane’s of nearly 25 years ago, should recognize Rafsanjani is no bargain.

So, is Rafsanjani playing both ends against the middle?

It certainly is a possibility. That said, did he set out to do this? I doubt it. But, opportunists usually have the biggest success in politics, as Napoleon said in other words.

As for the why?

I think Rafsanjani has had his eye on Khamenei’s seat for some time. Maybe he thinks he can’t get it by a democratic (within the Council) ousting of Khamenei while he’s still alive. And, since Rafsanjani is five years older, he can't he can’t afford to try to outwait Khamenei.

As for America’s best interests, since Rafsanjani is a former president, too, it might actually be WORSE for him to replace Khamanei.

Iran – fraud still not proven

The pre-election Terror Free Poll, cited by the Washington Post, showed Ahmadinejad clearly leading among Iranians indicating a presidential preference.

But Juan Cole tut-tuts the poll, claiming many Iranians were too afraid to speak out.

Tosh, per the pollsters. Four of five people surveyed — not just four of five respondents — said they wanted to get rid of the Council of Guardians, the group of clerics headed by Grand Ayatollah Khamenei.

I’m with Ken Ballen of TFT; it’s likely Iranians wanted Ahmadinejad as best defender of Iran against the West. That’s kind of in line with my previous thought that many Iranians may have seen an Ahmadinejad vote as a chance to say Eff You to the West.

That said, Cole, in a later post, has more ammunition for the linearity of returns being questionable.

And, speaking of that, Sully lamely claims The One is right in uttering not a word of support for the opposition, on the grounds Ahmadinejad would use this to show Mousavi et al as Western pawns. His idea? Barry should wear a green tie.

Strange, Sully’s worries didn’t seem to be given a second thought in Berlin; Chancellor Angela Merkel called Basij thuggery “completely unacceptable.”

The Telegraph, in part of its op-ed comparing Obama in silence to a Trappist Monk, reminds us that Germany is Europe’s largest exporter to Iran, and yet Merkel still said what she did.

(And, that all said, Sully’s been about as much a post-election disappointment as his love buddy.)

Finally, as Allahpundit notes, in a very good “big picture” rundown, the real winner in this could be Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who, if the chips fall right, could replace Khamenei. That said “moderate seeing” Americans of today, no less than the Bud McFarlane’s of nearly 25 years ago, should recognize Rafsanjani is no bargain.

So, is Rafsanjani playing both ends against the middle?

Note: When I talk about "fraud," I'm talking as instigated by Khamenei, not by Ahmadinejad, as part of a larger coup effort.