‘The Limits of Power’ – Bacevich’s lucid take

Andrew Bacevich’s new book, “The Limits of Power,” is blindingly brilliant in its simplicity.

This slim tome ought to be required reading in every high school American government or civics class.

On this blog, I have repeatedly excoriated “American exceptionalism” in BOTH its Republican and Democratic forms.

And now, Bacevich gives a professional historical take on this. Building on historians such as Paul Kennedy and his “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” Bacevich notes we also transitioned from an empire of industry (and yes, we’re an empire) to an empire of consumption, more than 30 years ago. (Kennedy speaks of the move from industry to finance as the mainstay of an economy as what has been a sure sign of decline in previous post-Renaissance great powers.)

Bacevich uses as a fulcrum Jimmy Carter’s famous — and famously misquoted and distorted — 1980 “crisis of confidence” speech.

At the same time, Carter, through the “Carter Doctrine” declaring the Persian Gulf a vital American interest furthered the problems with the “empire of consumption,” Bacevich notes.

And, what Carter said, and what Bacevich says, is that the problem lies not just in Washington, but in Austin, Albany and county seats. It lies not just on Wall Street, but on Main Streets.

The third main section of the book, on military policy, is the most interesting. Unlike “citizen reader” critics on places like Amazon, what Bacevich said in this section is certainly not dry, nor difficult to follow.

Some of it, though, sounds exactly like he accuses Tommy Franks of doing — settling scores. Perhaps we should be thankful that Bacevich just got his bird and not any stars. Of course, his unwillingness to play Army politics may explain that in the first place. And that, in turn, although Bacevich kindly doesn’t say so, is why we’ve had what he also kindly does not call “detritus” to generally lead our armed forces in the last generation or so. (Colin Powell was widely seen as a political officer already in Vietnam.)

Some critics claim the book doesn’t offer solutions, but that’s quite untrue. The solutions include:
• Stop believing we’re more enlightened abroad than we actually are;
• Actually do something serious to cut our oil consumption;
• Live m ore within our means otherwise;
• Practice Cold War-type containment, not regime change, in the Muslim world.

Those are simple solutions, but Nos. 2 and 3 rely in large part on Main Streets and individual Americans, not Wall Street or Washington.

And, that’s probably why negative critics and low raters on Amazon claim it doesn’t offer solutions. The truth is, it doesn’t offer either “magic bullet” or NIMBY-type solutions.

Informed American voters and readers call this book a screed, and ignore its warnings about their own behavior, at the peril of themselves and the nation.

That said, the book, like “The New American Militarism,” has one shortcoming. While Bacevich talks a lot about oil supply, he never discusses Peak Oil.

A century-old reality check for progressives

Way back in 1908, Arthur Fisher Bentley was arguing Progressives needed to apply Realpolitik to politics.

Now, in the linked New Yorker story, Nicholas Lemann argues today’s progressive theoreticians such as Thomas Frank need to re-read Bentley and apply his ideas to today.

First, Bentley’s bona fides. A Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins, then taken not into academia, but Chicago journalism. As for politics, he worked on Robert La Follette’s 1924 Progressive Party presidential run.

Second, a thumbnail sketch, to whet your appetite.

Bentley says there is no “public interest,” just the interest of different, well, interest groups within the public interest.

Lobbying groups serve these interests; reach for your wallet when they claim to serve the “public interest.”

There’s two forms of political groups — lobbying-type groups and talking-type groups. The CFR, let alone many other folks, wasn’t around a century ago, but it seems clear this is the type of folks Bentley meant.

Third, contra Frank in “What’s the Matter with Kansas,” Lemann says that Bentley, were he alive today, would say that Kansas social conservatives believe they have a perceived interest in pulling the GOP lever. Maybe not all of them have thought about the financial side of voting for a GOP that also includes Grover Norquist. Maybe, in many cases, they have, and have determined the fiscal GOP isn’t that big a deal, or that maybe they’ll get lucky and get their extra slice of financial pie soon, or that, on idealistic grounds, they actually agree with Norquist as well as wanting to criminalize abortion.

Lemann also ties this to how McCain, and perhaps especially Obama, now seem to be disappointing followers, but I think he’s weak here.

Personally, I wouldn’t have any problem if Obama were in medias politicas res more when it’s time to compromise. But, when you don’t actually stake out that many positions in the first place, content to be an empty vessel or a mirrored blank slate, then, when you do stake out principles, it’s what progressives might accept after the work of compromise is done, whereas there’s been no negotiation to a compromise on Obama’s part, it’s a point Lemann misses.

That aside, I think it’s also a great insight on why post-World War II third parties in America have never gained traction. Today’s Greens and Libertarians are too idealistic to muck it up. The Reform Party, as founded, had no interest group, just an interest person, Ross Perot. And, its failure, between Perot’s two runs, let alone afterward, to define itself led to its essential demise.