Scientism, philosophy, and the Big Bang

Regular readers of this blog and my main one both know that I like to comment at times on the issue of "scientism," which is, in a nutshell, certain scientists overblown claims for science, that it has explanatory power, or will at some day, and explanatory frameworks for many things that are rightly regarded as philosophical.

Aesthetics would be a great example.

"De gustibus non disputandum" Romans said 2,000 years ago, and it's just as true today.

Science has basically nothing to tell — certainly, hard sciences have basically nothing to tell — about why I think Mozart is overrated by many people. He IS and you shut up!

In some instances, the social sciences may indeed have some explanatory value, but even there, it's overblown. The hard sciences, though, are where scientism really hits the road.

And, last week, with Roger Penrose getting the Physics Nobel for his work on black holes, his naysayers on his anti-Big Bang ideas popped up.

I have little doubt Ethan Siegal knows cosmology well. Philosophy, including philosophy of science or more narrowly, philosophy of physics, )per the likes of Massimo Pigluicci postulating "philosophies of ..." for separate hard sciences at least) not so much, it would seem, per this anti-Penrose diatribe.

He says, near the end:

This presents a tremendous challenge for cosmology, and for science in general. In science, when we see some phenomena that our theories cannot explain, we have two options. 

1. We can attempt to devise a theoretical mechanism to explain those phenomena, while simultaneously maintaining all the successes of the prior theory and making novel predictions that are distinct from the prior theory’s predictions. 

2. Or we can simply assume that there is no explanation, and the Universe was simply born with the properties necessary to give us the Universe we observe. 

Only the first approach has scientific value, and therefore that’s the one that must be tried, even if it fails to yield fruit.

Uhh, wrong!

Accepting there is no explanation is itself of scientific value. It cuts down on possible pseudoscience; it allows scientific inquiry to be directed more productively, and other things.

And, in terms of philosophy of science, it leads to some epistemic humility. (That itself is something lacking in spades among many scientism practitioners.)

Siegal needs to read himself some early Wittgenstein and learn when to be silent.

Now, at times, explanations manifest themselves years or decades later. Planck's solving of the blackbox radiation problem, directly tied to Siegel's post, is one such answer.

BUT.

Even that is not guaranteed. Siegel acting like scientific answers are guaranteed is textbook scientism.

A Game with Words: We must run Wittgenstein through Hume

Philosopher friend Dan Kaufman surely would or will disagree if or when he sees this, but I shall explain that header.

On Ludwig Wittgenstein, he does have a lot of insight, but, I don’t ennoble him like Dan does. (Dan might object a bit to the word "ennoble," but ... I'll stand by its sentiment.)

In part, that’s because one can go “meta” on Wittgenstein’s language games idea. I think Walter Kaufmann, with his somewhat contrarian rejection of “guilt” and “justice” as universals or quasi-universals kind of gets at that.

But, there are other issues. And, expanding on a comment I left on a post at Massimo Pigliucci's blog, here are a few of them.

1. Are we talking about descriptive or prescriptive use of a particular word, or words in general?

2. Can we even agree on what “prescriptive” and “descriptive” mean, either in general or with a particular word?

3. How do we make such judgments?

These are just a few of many ideas related to this issue.           

In short, Wittgenstein’s idea on language games, in the real world, must be run through …

Wait for it, those of you know one of my favorite philosophers …

Wittgenstein must in some way be run through Ye Olde Philter of Induction, courtesy David Hume.

I have to disagree with Massimo Pigliucci: a public intellectual misstep?

And, regular readers of this blog, or viewers of my comments on Google+, will probably be surprised. And they should be.

Oh, sure, we have some differences of opinion on what free will may or may not be. But, those are fairly nuanced positions on an issue where there's little certain knowledge at all.

Rather, I'm disagreeing a bit more substantially with ideas behind his latest post, On the Biology of Race.

Obviously, this can be an explosive issue. I certainly agree with the thumping he gives to Nicholas Wade's new book. He does acknowledge that Wade does give credence (if Wade isn't just using a rhetorical gambit; I've not yet read the book) to Hume's is/ought distinction.

But, trying to redefine the word "race"? No.

Massimo first notes this:

“Race” is a rather fuzzy concept in biology to begin with, even outside of the human case. More often than not, however, in biology a race is a subspecies, or incipient species

So far, so good.

But, then, we have at best, a stumble, at second best, a wrong turning, and at third best, a violation of at least the spirit of the Tractatus-era Wittgenstein and his famous quote, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

Here's that wrong turning.

If human races are not subspecies, is there any scientifically meaningful way to recover the concept of “race” as it applies to our species, and how does this square with the “folk” concept of species (i.e., with talk of “blacks, Caucasians, Asians,” and so forth)?

Jonathan Kaplan and I (first reference mentioned in [6]) think there is. We suggested that human races are really what biologists call “ecotypes” [11], geographically distinct populations that have evolved some special way of adapting to their local environment.

I'm not disagreeing with him as a biologist. I have no academic standing to do so. And, I have no doubt the word "race" can be defined as an "ectype," as he does.

The real question is, Should it be?

In other words, should be be using the word "race" at all?

I say no, firmly so.

We've at least gotten past "race" used for a cultural grouping from one country, like "the English race" or the "British race," etc., that was common out of the mouth of a Teddy Roosevelt or a young Winston Churchill. It's time to take the next step, and, as much as possible, stop using "race" for people of different skin tones.

Unfortunately, Massimo focuses his ecotypes for human races exactly on generalized, or overgeneralized, or even stereotypical, racial characteristics:

The idea, then, is that certain superficial physical characteristics in humans — chiefly, but not exclusively, skin and eye color — did evolve genetically, likely in response to natural selection for adaptation to certain types of environments, most obviously dark skin to protect people from high levels of UV radiation, and light skin to minimize inability to synthesize vitamin D in places where high incidence of sunlight is not the most pressing problem.

Eye color may be a spandrel, or, at least, co-evolved.

Skin color? H. sapiens arctus could have evolved a different mechanism for Vitamin D needs, like more efficient obtaining of it from food sources. After all, Andeans and Himalayans have evolved different mechanisms for living at high altitude. And, Southeast Asians have evolved a rough parallel to West Africans' sickle-cell defense against malaria.

And, on skin tone, many East Asians, even ones at more northerly latitudes, are of slightly to moderately darker skin than many Europeans.

That said, he goes on to acknowledge some of this.

For instance, light skin evolved following different genetic pathways in Western and Eastern Eurasian populations. Moreover, although South Asian populations retained the ancestral dark pigmentation, its genetic modulation appears to be very different from that of, say, West African populations.

Fair enough? Well, maybe, maybe not. It's only a partial acknowledgement, not a full one. Nor is it an acknowledgement that by focusing on skin tone, Massimo's barking up the wrong ecotype tree.

Docgee in comments speaks for me here:

If you already have a perfectly good term, i.e., “ecotype,” then what’s the point of tacking “race” onto it? You admit that your definition has little in common with the “folk” definition, which is in fact very different. So what is there that’s so attractive about “race” that you feel the need to revive (and redefine) the term at all? Since most people feel they already know what “race” means, using it as an alternative to “ecotype” will only lead to confusion. And in the process, encourage the many racists among us.

Moreover, when you actually study the literature of population genetics you’ll see that there is no such thing as a human “ecotype” either. At least not in any sense remotely comparable to race. What “race” are the Ainu of Japan, who are phenotypically “caucasian”? What race are the Andaman Islanders, who look “just like” African Pygmies, but are much closer genetically to Asians. What “race” are American “blacks,” many of whom are primarily of European or British descent, yet simply look “negroid” to your typical American.

Exactly. While Massimo again gives a nod to a narrow focus on ecotypes:

As we have seen, insofar as biologically meaningful races are conceptualized as populations more like ecotypes than like incipient species, many of the arguments purporting to show that there are no human races miss their mark.

He still doesn't discuss why skin tone, contra a Docgee, should be the starting point for defining, or defining into existence, human ecotypes.

So, I correct myself. As a layperson, I'm not disagreeing with his knowledge of biology, I'm disagreeing with the way he's constructing definitions.

So, let's say that this is a philosophical disagreement. It's about philosophy of language, and since it's about said branch of philosophy in the use of science, it's a philosophy of science disagreement of sorts.

But, it's more than that.

Massimo stresses the value of public intellectuals, and that's the ultimate grounds of my disagreement. I think, again with Docgee having taken the words out of my mouth, that he is indeed erring as a public intellectual.

Two paragraphs above the last one, he says:

The upshot is that when people think of “blacks” as a race, they are not actually picking a scientifically coherent unit, only one that is defined by a mishmash of small and superficial set of biological traits (skin color etc.) and a convoluted cultural history.

Followed by this in the same paragraph of the "as we have seen" quote:

But again, biology provides no support for the very strong, essentialist-style conception of ‘race’ that has, both historically and at present, underwritten racism (of both the individual and institutional varieties), and indeed, biology reveals that the assumptions underlying such a conception of race are false.

So, why still use the word "race"?

I think Massimo is missing the boat on a branch of evolutionary biology that we both agree is often overblown. However, it is a branch that, with both the word "pop" and the idea of it removed, does have some legitimate contributions.

I'm talking about evolutionary psychology.

Xenophobia is an evolutionarily-guided human trait. The idea of the "outgroup" is deeply rooted.

And, skin color, when people from different parts of the world are thrown into close proximity, especially in larger numbers, is a mentally easy way to distinguish "outgroups."

And, those outgroups have been labeled with the word "race." Even as "we" know that there's no connection between skin tone and other heritable characteristics, people with PhDs still claim there are such connections.

Like Phillipe Rushton. Or, without a PhD, Steve Sailer, referenced as an expert by a Jamaican native, JayMan, who says he is of part African ancestry, here.

Massimo, if dipping into the waters of evolutionary psychology is too much, this might actually be a good time for a quaff of Dan Dennett and his observations about folk psychology. You use the word "folk" yourself, but don't seem to see this as an "aha" moment.

So, no, Massimo.

Because, pace Wittgenstein above and the later linguistic Wittgenstein, to speak of a term loaded with baggage that has sociological and political science connotations, is to speak of a word that, in the public square can't be so easily redefined, and certainly not unilaterally so. (The repeated comments of JayMan, complete with references to posts from his blog, to which I shall not link, are proof positive of this.) And, since political science, in a case like this might even connect to political philosophy, we're definitely back in public intellectual territory.

To riff on John Roberts, the way to stop talking about "race" is to stop talking about "race." Except when necessary to refute the traditional "folk" concept.

Period and end of story.

To try to redefine the word, still using biological concepts, still leaves the door open for the racialist Sailers of the world to commit deliberate bull's-eye fallacies by defining "ecotypes" the way they want to.

Per that later Wittgenstein, and ordinary language philosophy, simply deny that "race" as understood in common language has biological standing.

Problems with determinism — mu to free will vs determinism, part 3

As a result of my blog posts about saying "mu" to the old free will vs. determinism battles, I've gone beyond talking about what I call "something like free will" that, decoupled from a Cartesian meaner and a Cartesian free willer, that we will find at the core of an eventually messy picture of what human consciousness is about.

I've started taking a bit more of a look at determinism. I've already said that classical determinism is undermined by quantum mechanics. Well, it's also undermined by things like chaos theory. Related to that, my ideas on "something like free will," as well as consciousness itself, is that both are going to prove out to be emergent properties, and with multiple layers of emergence. Hence, as we might talk about the consciousness of a gorilla, while noting that's not on the same level of consciousness as a human, ditto, the "something like free will" of a gorilla, if we think a gorilla has enough consciousness to manifest this, will be of a different level as that of a human.

But, back to determinism and its being undercut by quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and other things.

A blog post I saw on Facebook via a Facebook friend of a friend gave me a philosophy "aha" moment a few days ago.

Per this blog post, isn't determinism subject to Aristotle's worries about an infinite regress, until it posits an undetermined Prime Determiner? I had never thought of that before, but at least more simplistic versions of determinism seem capable of shooting themselves in the foot on this.

Beyond that, I have some psychology-related concerns with determinism. Or, rather, with how many of its ardent backers present it, as well as with determinism itself.

They can come off as too black and white, often not just about determinism vs. free will but about issues in consciousness in general. In turn, this can reflect a broader overly black-and-white approach to issues scientific, manifested in things like a hard or greedy reductionism.

And, people who read me on philosophical musings are probably aware that I say not "mu" but a flat "no" to greedy reductionism. That includes accusing the likes of Dan Dennett of being a greedy reductionist even as he denies that he is.

That, in turn, is why I reject his compatibalist version of free will, and others' as well. Why should free will be bent into a pretzel to be made compatible with some classical or classical-like version of determinism? Why shouldn't determinism be made to move at least halfway itself? Other than the narrowest idea of, what's logically possible or not in terms of action given a particular human's physical state X within a surrounding physical state Y, I don't think free will needs to bend itself to be compatible with determinism at all.

So, if we use the word "compatibilism" narrowly, call me a compatibilist. If not, don't. But, I'm not at all an incompatibilitist, so don't call me that.

The problem is, per this piece by Smith on libertarian free will, most compatibilists, in my opinion, define both it and incompatibilism badly. And, he goes further down that route in his next piece in his series, undercutting libertarianism and contra-causal issues. (I'm not a libertarian free willer, let me stress.)

The failure? It's at core a failure to distinguish between hard determinism, on the one hand, and what I've called psychological constraints or similar, on the other. I don't consider past elements of our lives, and the degree to which they've implanted and developed certain tendencies, likelihoods and directions within us, to be "determinism" at all. And, we may be differently constrained, by degree of constraint, on different current issues at different times in our lives by different specific issues from our pasts. It could be 90 percent at some times, near but not at one pole, 10 percent at other times, and 40 percent at yet other times.

Hence, I can voice some quasi-libertarian argument for "something like free will" without being an incompatibilist. Call me a "soft libertarian" or whatever. Maybe an "emergent libertarian." Or, per my first phrase, a "quasi-libertarianian."

Anyway, more on how Smith and others like him go wrong?

It's like the nature-vs-nurture argument in human development. Defenders of all-nature are like compatibilists, and defenders of all-nurture are like incompatibilitists. (And we haven't even talked about a philosophy of mind analogy to epigenetics yet!)

Anyway, that in turn gets back to my original "mu." Within saying "mu" to free will vs determinism, I now officially say "mu" to compatibilism vs incompatibilism.

I think I've made myself as clear as I can on why I say that, within the constraints of language on philosophy of mind that's already badly muddied.

Finally, while Smith's series has enlightened my thinking a bit, and sharpened my thinking a fair degree, I find him about as wanting as Dennett, ultimately, and for similar reasons.

Per Tractatus-era Wittgenstein, can't philosophers of mind in general be more precise with their language on this issue, and shut up if they can't?

Consciousness is not the same as attentiveness

It's long been established that we have what could be called "subconscious attentiveness," which can cause things such as certain types of psychological priming through images being presented to people, but too quickly for them to be consciously aware of the images.

It now appears, in the latest in attempts to unravel human consciousness, that this cuts both ways.

But, the story doesn't go as far as it could, both on speculation and on Wittgenstein-like questions on our use of language on these issues.

Perhaps "consciousness," "attentiveness" and "awareness" need more precision in usage in such aspects. Or maybe they need to be redefined to some degree. Or replaced.

Whether language will be crafted to this end remains to be seen.

Atheists who willingly defend misleading language are a frustration

Two weeks ago, I blogged about the latest Pew Research Poll on American religious beliefs, noting this absurdity, among other things:

Americans are so religiously and metaphysically STUPID, on average, that one out of five Americans who claim to be religiously unaffiliated and atheist claim to also believe in a divinity. Half of agnostics in that group make the same claim. ...

Hey, idiots. If you believe something, you can’t be agnostic about it!

But, all is not well in atheist land from where I sit.

Apparently, some people, some atheists, want to defend the use of misleading language, specifically, the illogical phrase “agnostic theism.” It’s a bad enough phrase in general, but in response to a blog post, and an original story, that both talked about “theism,” “agnosticism” and “atheism” all as belief states, it’s off-putting to say the least.

Here is the bottom line, with a sharp, hard-hitting analogy from American politics:

“Agnostic theism” is like “Democratic Republicanism” and “theistic agnosticism” is like “Republican Democratism.” (Allow the neologism for the noun parallel.)

Or, for Konstantine in Germany, “Agnostic theism” is like “Social Democratic-Christian Democratism” and “theistic agnosticism” is like “Christian Democratic-Social Democratism.”

There. I know everybody reading can understand that analogy.

To Konstantine, Adrian and Austin, I adapt my longer reply based on comments from my original post, with concluding thoughts following this long blockquote:

I stand by the original post, and I stand by saying that you’re using (potentially) misleading language. You, too, or you especially, Austin.

First, it’s clear that I, and the NYTimes linked story were talking about beliefs (or, my alternative phraseology, influenced by Dan Dennett, of “metaphysical belief,”) all along, and not knowledge. The word “belief” is in the first paragraph of my original post.

So, Austin, I never conflated “belief” and “knowledge.” I then said, if you can get Bob Carroll of The Skeptic’s Dictionary to prove me wrong, I’d listen.

Well, I went ahead and did my own research:
First, in hardcopy, my “Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion,” by William L. Reese, says this under “agnosticism”:

It is usually applied, however, principally, to suspension of belief with respect to God. (Emphasis added.)

Now, Bob Carroll does use the word “knowledge,” but as subordinate to “belief”:

Agnosticism is the position of believing that knowledge of the existence or non-existence of God is impossible.

Note the definition is about belief, again.

Again, I've been referring to belief all the time.

So has the Pew poll.

And, per that definition, let me rephrase my original critique:

Phrases like “agnostic theism” or “theistic agnosticism” in that both the governing noun and the adjective talk about states of belief, or metaphysical stances, to use my phrase ...

ARE MISLEADING.

You have incompatible belief states being smashed together.

I don't care if “agnostic theism” has 5,000 Google hits, either. I don’t even care if there’s a website called AgnosticTheism.com. No, I refuse to give it a hyperlink. (Added note to all: remember, “appeal to the crowd” is a logical fallacy anyway.)

I argue that is further proof of the Pew poll, anway. And, beyond that, neither Reese nor Carroll use either that phrase or “theistic agnosticism.”

And, as I said earlier, Austin, I don’t even care if you’re the atheism “guide” for About.com.

Thank doorknob there’s only 5,000 deluded Google hits, too. (Even more fortunately, the equally oxymoronic “theistic agnosticism” has less than 500 hits.)

Next, to tackle this linguistic oxymoron from another angle, let me go to a comment I made on the original post:

Re the Wiki link on agnostic theism that (db0) posts, let’s carefully analyze the English language used here.

“Theism” is the noun. Nouns always take precedence over adjectives like “agnostic.”

For example, you can have simple noun-verb, or N-V, sentences. You cannot have a noun-adjective, or N-Adj, sentence.

The reverse also holds true. You CANNOT be an agnostic, as a primary belief state, and modify it with “theistic,” either. (See below, outside of this blockquote, for a

But I will get beyond that

As for (Konstantine's) implication that many people in Germany, or elsewhere in Europe, or in online communities of his, may understand “atheism” to mean “irreligious,” well, then obviously a bunch of people in those communities are as stupid as they are here. Maybe the equivalent of Pew should poll them. And, I’ll call irreligious people in the UK who call themselves “atheists” idiots, too, db0. Give me e-mail addresses, and I'll even e-mail them that.

Ditto for agnostics using misleading language, or atheists who abet them.

And, as for Konstantine criticizing me, well, instead, he could have taken my article as it read and corrected stupid people on his and Adrian’s side of the pond.

And, per that definition, let me rephrase my original critique of all of you:

Phrases like “agnostic theism” or “theistic agnosticism” in that both the governing noun and the adjective talk about states of belief, or metaphysical stances, to use my phrase ...

ARE MISLEADING.

Merriam-Webster also agrees with me on the use of “agnosticism.”

Dictionary.com, especially in its first listed definition, agrees as well.

Wittgenstein would be turning over in his grave, if he could.

If I were dead, and could turn over in my grave, I definitely would, too.

I didn’t do my original post, nor this follow-up, seeking to be a one-person English-language equivalent of the Académie française, but I stand by my grammar and linguistics comments. I’m not against neologisms by any means; that’s how Shakespeare enlivened our language 400 years ago.

I AM against confusing, or unnecessary, neologisms, though, and this one, or the two non-equivalent ones, are confusing.

And, I am going to critique Thomas Huxley a bit, too.

I offer one more analogy:

It’s as if Huxley were working on a syllogism. “Knowledge” may have been the fulcrum of his major premise, but “belief” was the keystone of his conclusion.

Beyond that, I blame him for bad language; even though etymology doesn’t determine meaning 100 years out or more, he should have invented “apisteia” or similar, rather than “agnosticism.”

Also, as I e-mailed Austin, I stand by my psychological observation that “agnostic theism” is an attempt to give an intellectual gloss to theistic beliefs. I do not mean that Konstantine or Austin is doing this. But, I mean that I believe it can be used that way, as a sort of a “intellectual New Ageism” for want of a better term. It’s like smearing lipstick on a dying-and-rising savior god, to riff on an American English cliché.

Let me add more.

As far as the “about me,” I don't know if you’ve clicked on that on my blog.

I have a graduate divinity degree, and have read philosophy at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Admittedly, that degree is 22 years old now. And, no, Austin, all my study was here in the U.S.

That said, I had never seen the phrase “agnostic theism” until you used it, Konstantine. No, Austin, I don’t read metaphysics books every day, but I do still keep my nose in philosophy books from time to time.

All that said ...

To the degree Konstantine objects to my “stupid” or “idiots” language, no apologies. Just like Hitchens has no need to apologizes for having the “strongest” language of the New Atheists. To go back to politics, would you call Dick Cheney a “not so nice guy”?

If it’s “condescending” to tell someone I think I have a variety of evidences for my use and understanding of the word “agnostic,” and that therefore I don’t want to “flog a dead horse” anymore, I don’t apologize for that, either. Argue with the dictionaries I linked.

And note that etymology does not define meaning. Besides, I believe Huxley was focused ultimately on “belief” and not “knowledge” anyway.

In my day job, I write an editorial column every week. Some times, there's no soft-spoken way to state something. And, yes, somebody may call that condescending too.

I absolutely reject Konstantine’s “Humpty Dumpty” argument via e-mail:

However, as long as people are speaking about the same thing then it’s all good. It doesn't matter if it’s called Theistic Agnosticism, Fidei[s]m or Purple Banana.

No it’s not. That’s why I said “read Wittgenstein” early on in the thread of comments to my original post.

I have certainly heard of “fideism,” but I don’t think it and “agnostic theism” mean the same thing.

Let’s go back to Wittgenstein once more. Along the lines of the “Tractatus,” not his later writings, I think “agnostic theism,” in one sense, says nothing. That is the thrust of my opening analogy.

And, if it’s “condescending” to say, “No, I won’t let you be Humpty Dumpty with words, at least not on my blog,” I can live with that, too.

In a softer vein, I told Konstantine that’s part of what enables fuzzy thinking and its growth. I do not know if this is an English-language issue, in some part, but I think not.(And, no, I do not mean that to be condescending.)

Adrian or anyone else who, after accepting the apology I offered to Konstantine about calling him a theist, and inferring he was British, still wants to delink my blog because I criticize his or your use of language?

Be my guest.

I would rather not be linked to you, in that case.

Final note: I reserve the right on this post to moderate or delete comments. Per comment to Konstantine, I do not at all mind sharpening wits with other people, but, the core issue has been defined. And no, I don’t think the linguistics are minor. As I told Konstantine, I do not want to go through the frustration of dead horse flogging. The core issue has been defined.

Beyond that, I don’t want the hassle of wondering when I’m going to be called “condescending” again.