Philosopher friend Dan Kaufman surely would or will disagree
if or when he sees this, but I shall explain that header.
On Ludwig Wittgenstein, he does have a lot of insight, but, I don’t
ennoble him like Dan does. (Dan might object a bit to the word "ennoble," but ... I'll stand by its sentiment.)
In part, that’s because one can go “meta” on Wittgenstein’s
language games idea. I think Walter Kaufmann, with his somewhat contrarian rejection of “guilt” and “justice” as universals or quasi-universals kind of
gets at that.
But, there are other issues. And, expanding on a comment I left on a post at Massimo Pigliucci's blog, here are a few of them.
1. Are we talking about descriptive or prescriptive use of a
particular word, or words in general?
2. Can we even agree on what “prescriptive” and “descriptive” mean, either in general or with a particular word?
3. How do we make such judgments?
These are just a few of many ideas related to this issue.
In short, Wittgenstein’s idea on language games, in the real
world, must be run through …
Wait for it, those of you know one of my favorite
philosophers …
Wittgenstein must in some way be run through Ye Olde Philter
of Induction, courtesy David Hume.
Fleeting sensations