SocraticGadfly

June 20, 2025

A special session for redistricting?

I doubt it, even if Trump wants it, is even begging for it.

Trump wants Strangeabbott to call the Lege into special session to further gerrymander its Congressional districts for 2026. Ain't gonna happen, I don't think but a sure sign of Trump's fears about the midterms. Texas' Congresscritters are mostly mum in public but worry they could be pitched into redistricting fights against each other, per the Chronic, which also notes that, as we speak and type, the state faces trial in El Paso over previous redistricting.

Legislative Republicans, on the other hand, are less reticent about criticizing the whole deal.

Also, per all of the above links, since Texas congressional seats are already fairly gerrymandered, there's a lot of question about how much this could add. And, if Texas stretches itself too thin, how it might even backfire, like in the 2018 midterms.

How much backdoor word will Congressional incumbents give to Strangeabbott and Legiscritters about their fears? How much will Abbott reference the ongoing suit to Trump as an excuse?

Haters in disguise of Ivan Katchanovski?

This is a prelude to what will be an expanded and amended version of a piece I posted earlier this month over at Substack about the Ukrainian-Canadian academic, called "The haters of Ivan Katchanovski, and other Ukrainian "traitors" like Marta Havryshko."

I only put a little bit about the Ukrainian "leftist" site Commons in that piece. Some of its editors might object to the word "leftist" in scare quotes. But, not everybody there may be leftist, and it's in scare quotes for another reason.

Katchanovski, for those deeply following not just the Russia-Ukraine war, but everything from the Euromaidan on, has claimed that the people killed at the Maidan were NOT shot by the Berkut security forces of then-president Yanukovich, but rather by far-right agitators, most likely to try to pressure his government into collapse, which happened soon after.

Here's a somewhat shorter piece of his. There and elsewhere, Katchanovski criticizes the investigation, including the later reconstruction of the scene, and above all, the use of AI as part of that reconstruction.

Here's what seems to be an OK but not great, relatively neutral analysis of Katchanovski's claims about the Maidan. The author, William Risch, an American college professor, claims that he overstates some things, like conclusiveness of who fired from the Hotel Ukraine, while adding that parts of his big picture holds up. The "seems to be" is in boldface for a reason, as we'll soon see. 

The author has spoken on sites like CGTN America, an American TV channel part of state-owned Chinese Central Television. OTOH, in an interview elsewhere, he claims Minsk II (not sure what else he means by the 2015 treaty) "would've essentially broken up the state from within," a claim I have never heard before. He's also written for Moscow Times. 

Commons' site's "about" calls itself a left-wing Ukrainian media group focused on economic issues. Note that Katchanovski's first book was about labor issues and that's his background with Seymour Martin Lipset, under whom he got his Ph.D., from George Mason. 

First, some larger picture things with Commons, then back to Risch's article.

One of the lead editors notes how Commons left Progressive International over its failure to offer what I will call a desired "blank-check" condemnation of Russia shortly after the invasion. The same person, editor Taras Bilous, says in another piece that Zelensky is the most moderate leader Ukraine could have elected from 2019 on, and defends him on the anti-Russian language, and memories, "Ukrainification" of the country. IF that's true (and I believe it is) ... doesn't that say something about your country?

Well, it says this, per a piece of his calling out to the Western left:

Ukraine isn’t even a classic liberal democracy—here, every new president tries to amass as much power as possible via informal mechanisms, the parliament passes unconstitutional laws, and rights and freedoms of citizens are often violated. Even during the war, the Ukrainian government has passed a law curtailing labor rights. In this respect, it is not very different from the rest of Eastern Europe.

I wouldn't argue. I would add that, to the degree NATO more and more overlaps with the EU, it's another argument for the US to reduce its NATO connections.

Bilous here claims that Right Sector, etc's recent influence in Ukraine has been overstated. Even if Zelensky did even less to implement Minsk II than Putin, out of fears for his safety or whatever? See your own other piece's pull-quote above, Bilous; seems like, at least through 2019, their influence has NOT been overstated.  

And here, opposing a "Finlandization" of NATO, he comes off looking like a leftist who still wants the US, if not NATO, to keep "Badgering" Russia, per Pope Francis' term. (And, though retreating from his dipping of toes into liberation theology, he WAS from the "global south.")

I believe there's a phrase for people like Bilous: "Controlled opposition." 

There is something else at play here.

That is why, per some of Bilous' comments about the Maidan, why is the only piece you have on Katchanovski's shooting claims being written by an American?

Why would Risch not link to anything Katchanovski has written in English? After all, courtesy Springer, his own book on that is open access.

And, per a piece already on Substack, which will have an amended version here, I want to quote from this book's preface:

I am a life-long supporter of liberal democracy, human rights, and peace in Ukraine and was one of the first to publicly call for the European Union accession of Ukraine. I attended in 1988 the first small opposition rally in Kyiv in some 80 years since Ukraine became Soviet. I was born in Western Ukraine.

He expands this on page 38:

The author is a Ukrainian and Canadian political scientist origi- nally from Western Ukraine and attended the first Ukrainian opposition demonstrations and rallies in Kyiv in 1988–1991. The author faced expulsion from the Kyiv National Economic University in 1990 and was prevented from pursuing graduate education in the Soviet Union for writing the final undergraduate thesis (in Ukrainian) because it was based on theories of Max Weber and Western economists and concluded that the Soviet system was bound to collapse. The author is a life-long supporter of liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and peace in Ukraine and publicly called before, during, and after the Euromaidan for the European Union accession of Ukraine, and opposed the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Dyer, 2022; Katchanovski, 2007, 2014b, 2018). However, it is professional and ethical duty of scholars to rely on evidence and not on political views or other considerations.

There you are. 

Let's add this, which many Westerners who run him up the flagpole and salute may not know:

Russia drastically escalated these conflicts by launching its illegal invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022

There we go. 

So, the idea that he's a "traitor" (he's been listed on a quasi-Ukrainian governmental intimidation and kill list called Myrotvorets) is laughable.

Why would you call it a "conspiracy theory," Risch?

After all, Katchanovski discusses global alleged (conspiracy theory) and actual false flags, and lists this among the conspiracy theories — one generated BY RUSSIA.

Various separatist and Russian politicians and media claimed that a downing of a Malaysian MH17 passenger plane in Donbas in 2014 was a false-flag attack. However, publicly available evidence, which was reported in the media, the social media, and a trial in the Netherlands, indicates that the plane was shot down with a missile by separatists from a Russian-supplied Buk because it was mistaken for a Ukrainian military plane.

(This, as well as earlier cites, are from his book.) 

Again, speaking of conspiracy theory:

With just some exceptions, these [Western mainstream media] reports without any evidence presented these snipers in the Maidan-controlled buildings or areas as Ukrainian government snipers or implied that they were the government snipers. But soon after the massacre, with some partial exceptions, these and other major media outlets referred to snipers in these Maidan-controlled locations as “a conspiracy theory,” denied their existence, or omitted this and other evidence of such snipers

You're busted, Risch. 

Why would Commons not give Katchanovski space to respond? Ask him to respond? He is NOT on the site's list of authors

Why would it wait until 2024 to have Risch write this? Was it because Katchanovski was "gaining traction" by then? 

(I have asked Commons all of this on Shitter, as well as to their most recent, as of the time I am typing, English-language Facebook post. We will see what, if any, response I get.) 

And, almost 18 months on, where is the book this is supposed to be part of? 

Speaking of books again?

In his book, Katchanovski has a callout of Risch, Taras Kuzio (mentioned in my Substack and to be mentioned in my part 2 of this, here), and one other person:

Kuzio, David Marples, and William Risch published their criticism in non-academic and non-peer-reviewed online publications.

No wonder Commons didn't ask him to respond. 

My bottom line? Katchanovski may be wrong about bullet issues. He may not be wrong. The use of AI a full decade ago, in its infancy, to "reconstruct" the Maidan shootings was horribly wrong. Look at what the botched autopsy of Jack Kennedy did here in the US. (I am NOT a JFK conspiracy theorist; I'm just saying that his autopsy, rushed at the personal pushing of Bobby Kennedy, and not done on site in Dallas by doctors who likely would have been cognizant of shooting angles, were one factor in opening the door to conspiracy theories.)

And with that, Commons goes too far in criticizing Katchanovski; he may not be right, but it's really impossible to prove him wrong on the narrow issue of the Maidan shootings. And, given Risch's statements, I think he's being willful in going too far.

Actually, it goes further than too far. It looks like it was looking for a hit piece that would throw a bone or two to critics to present it as something less than a hit piece. 

Elsewhere on that site, Howie Hawkins does an interview that throws Jill Stein under the "Putin's puppet" bus about as thoroughly as the Democratic National Committee has been doing for nine years and counting! Of course, Hawkins bit too hard on Russiagate in 2020 and has never backed off. 

That said, I wonder if it's been intimidated enough itself that it pulls punches. As in Myrotvorets intimidated. But, I don't think so. (It has one piece on Myrotvorets, but that from 2016.)

Let us also note that Katchanovski is NOT NOT NOT the only Ukrainian academic or public intellectual expat to tackle these issues. Here's Truthout with two others besides him at a conference, already in late 2014. 

June 19, 2025

Texas Progressives talk politics, hypocrisy, more

 Off the Kuff notes the official entry of former Mayor Annise Parker and the potential entry of City Council member Letitia Plummer into the Harris County Judge's race.

Your correspondent, hearing former Helltown mayor Annise Parker, famous here for saying it would surpass Chicago in population (only because of handouts to big biz, if it happens, before they're all flooded out), wants to replace Lina Hidalgo as Harris County Judge, says Gack! And why now? And, even though Hidalgo has issues, I doubt Parker can — or is the person to — take her out.

Texans for Lawsuit Reform is muttering about primarying some recalcitrant House Rethuglicans. Frankly, given the rise of Wilkes and Dunn, et al, I think TLR is yesterday's news in many ways. That's in part because their 2024 primarying often failed.

SocraticGadfly talked aboutfact vs fiction on David Hogg.

State police arrested one person re threats against the No Kings rally in Austin.

Dan Patrick hates THC, but his new brain institute will study an illegal psychedelic.

The Monthly fellates Ken Burns' American Revolution series.

Mike Miles got a big extension as Houston ISD head cheese despite a number of concerns about his work there. That's after four of five members of the state-imposed board of managers got the boot, even as TEA extended its control two more years.

The traditional roofing industry hates cooling roofs.

Neil at the Houston Democracy Project offered a report about the successful Houston No Kings protest at City Hall.

The Texas Observer sums up the abortion rights landscape after the recent legislative session.  

Your Local Epidemiologist is horrified by the decimation of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). Law Dork searches for the people Trump has had deported. 

The San Antonio Report draws some lessons from the 2025 San Antonio elections. 

Deceleration takes a closer look at protest activity around the country

June 18, 2025

Trump doesn't have a foreign policy and is not a neocon (nor a "dove")

Zach Beauchamp nailed the former earlier today.

Contra Klippenstein yesterday, it's not Trump being a typical global statesman, saying one thing publicly, another privately.

It's that Trump is a weathervane as a well as a blowhard, with his own gaseousness arguably spinning his own vane.

So this:

This is the world of statecraft at the highest level, where leaders say one thing and do another. This is not only for “deniability” sake or to intentionally mislead the public. It’s just the way of the world that includes a set of rules and workarounds that allows leaders to never be frank.

Is close to laughable.

Klip should know better. 

THIS, per my weathervane comment above:

Trump’s own foreign policy thinking does not align neatly with either of the two main camps. The president does not do systematic foreign policy, but rather acts on the basis of a collection of impulses that could never amount to anything so grandiose as a doctrine. Those gut instincts include a sense that the United States should look out for itself only, ignore any rules or norms that might constrain it, use force aggressively without regard to civilian casualties, and seek “deals” with other states that advantage the United States and/or make Donald Trump look good personally. 
It looks, in effect, like an internationalized version of Trump’s approach to New York real estate in the 1980s and 1990s.

Is the reality.

Beauchamp notes he's been saying some version of this since Trump's first run in 2016. 

He then looks at what this means today, specially with a Trump 2.0 going more quickly off the handle, off "script" (that others want for him) and more:

His lack of ideology does not mean that he can be permanently persuaded by one faction or the other, but rather produces volatility. The president has teetered back and forth between interventionism and isolationism, depending on the interplay between Trump’s idiosyncratic instincts and whoever he’s talking with on a particular day.
Given the near-dictatorial power modern presidents have over foreign policy, this will likely produce something worse than ideological rigidity: an incoherent, mutually contradictory policy that ends up undermining itself at every turn. At a moment of acute geopolitical peril, when Trump’s ascendant hawkish allies are calling for yet another war of regime change in the Middle East, it’s easy to see how that could end in true disaster.

So, at best, he's "manageable" in some way, to some degree, and no more.

It's a reality that, without articulating it quite so strongly, nor tying it to Trump's past, I recognized clearly at the start of Trump 2.0. 

Beauchamp then gets to the "weathervane" angle:

Trump’s second-term record, in short, is a tangle of incoherent policies and whiplash-inducing policy shifts. There is no consistent vision of the world, just whatever Trump decides policy should be in the moment — regardless of how much it contradicts what he’s said or done previously.

Bingo. 

Per the "manageable," Beauchamp gets to this next:

While he has some fixed and unchangeable views, like his peculiar idea that trade deficits are inherently bad, there are many areas on which he doesn’t have a strong opinion about the facts — and can be talked in one direction or another. This is the well-known phenomenon of Trump making public pronouncements based on whoever he spoke to most recently.

Again,  bingo.

The problem is that in Trump 2.0, as Beauchamp notes, there are NO "careerists" to at least partially stabilize him. Look at the texting scandal already at NSA. Hegseth at Defense. Rubio at State. Gabbard at DNI. All total flunkies inside the White House, with a chief of staff who knows zip about foreign policy.

But, not just Klip, but people like The Dissident, Simplicius and John Mearsheimer all appear to not yet 100 percent grasp at times. 

Beauchamp spends the rest of the piece detailing Trump's whiplash-inducing moves.

Now, he was somewhat this way in Trump 1.0, but not this hyperactively and sharply. 

And, Trump 1.0 leads us to "not a dove."

This comes via Greg Sargent at New Republic, talking about Trump railing at Cucker Tarlson. In it, he references a 2023 Beauchamp piece. Again, Zach nails it.

He devotes much of the first half of the piece to refuting a Christian Parenti piece claiming Trump 1.0 (and presumably 2.0) is an anti-imperialist. (Leftists like Parenti are why I identify as a "skeptical leftist.")

The nutgraf of his response summary is well in:

This is a president who pardoned convicted war criminals, assassinated Iran’s top general, and deployed troops to seize Syria’s oil deposits — openly admitting he wanted to hand them over to ExxonMobil. A second term promises more of the same: He has already asked advisers for “battle plans” to invade Mexico in an effort to combat drug cartels.

Bingo. 

But, we have a longer takedown of a claim by the guy now Trump's Veep, Bagger Vance. that Trump is a "dove" of some sort. A long block quote is needed here:

The strongest argument for Trump’s dovish credentials, in all of these accounts, is that Trump did not start any new wars. While Bush invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, and Obama toppled Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, Trump kept the peace. 
“In Mr. Trump’s four years in office, he started no wars despite enormous pressure from his own party and even members of his own administration,” Vance writes. “Not starting wars is perhaps a low bar, but that’s a reflection of the hawkishness of Mr. Trump’s predecessors and the foreign-policy establishment they slavishly followed.” 
It’s certainly true that nothing Trump did compares in scope to the Iraq or Afghanistan wars. But few presidents in history ordered anything of that magnitude; the brief 2011 US intervention in Libya doesn’t come close. And when you compare Trump’s record to those of other post-Cold War US presidents, the evidence is clear: Trump is no less willing to use military force, and arguably more so. 
Some of the data is sobering. Contra Parenti, Trump did a lot more than order “few missile and drone strikes”: In Iraq and Syria alone, drone strikes launched against ISIS and other terrorist groups killed an estimated 13,400 civilians, per data from Airwars, a nonprofit watchdog affiliated with the University of London. That’s roughly three times as many as were killed by American bombs in the 1991 Gulf War, the 1998-1999 Kosovo intervention, and the Libya war combined. 
It’s relatively easy to show Trump’s culpability here: His administration relaxed Obama-era rules of engagement designed to protect civilians. And once swampy Joe Biden became president, drone strikes in Syria and Iraq virtually ended. 
That’s just one area. His broader record, in the Middle East and elsewhere, provides plenty of evidence of Trump’s hawkishness. 
In 2017, Trump became the first US president to order an attack on the Syrian government, bombing an airfield in retaliation for chemical weapons strikes, something Obama famously refused to do. In 2018, he pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal and bombed Syrian government positions again. In 2019, Trump approved airstrikes on Iranian soil, only to call the planes back literally while they were in the air. And in 2020, he had General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Quds force, assassinated while the Iranian leader was near the Baghdad airport. 
Similarly, Trump dramatically increased US airstrikes on Islamist groups in Somalia over Obama levels, and approved the sale of unguided “dumb” bombs to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen (something the Obama administration blocked). Though Trump frequently stated his opposition to the war in Afghanistan, and eventually did negotiate a withdrawal agreement, he began his presidency by escalating it — sending 3,000 new troops to fight the Taliban, a more than 25 percent increase from the pre-Trump presence. He also openly bragged about relaxing rules of engagement for bombings in Afghanistan, a policy that nearly doubled civilian casualties per year over the Bush- and Obama-era average. 
In 2017, before he became friends with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, Trump nearly started a war with his country — deploying an “armada” (his words) to the region, and threatening the North with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” in the midst of mounting tensions surrounding Pyongyang’s nuclear program.

There you are. 

There's more where that came from. For example, I haven't even cited Beauchamp analyzing Trump on China. (And, that thought right now is scary indeed.)

Read all of both pieces. And, for the people I called out, and more? Learn something! 

It probably won't happen. The Dissident wrote about Trump and foreign policy about six hours after I posted this. I tagged him with the Substack version of this piece, in part because he and the others above are actually named in the subhed there.

I'm sure he won't like it, and doubt he responds. Even without a link to post then, I said he was wrong last week about Tulsi Gabbard being a sellout rather than an opportunist. I then wrote about that, and further information today indicates she's not even totally being an opportunist. 

And, re Iran? Beauchamp says "let's make a deal" Trump got mad a deal didn't happen, and flipped. That, like his ironclad belief in tariffs and hating trade deficits, is another "North Star" — negotiations must be on his terms, especially with weaker partners. (It's why Trump TACOs to Xi and Putin, too.)

I also disagree with the header of his piece. Rather than Trump sheepdogging populists, the most "MAGA" of the populists are self-sheepdoggers.

I've already called out Simplicius, not just once but twice, for issues broadly related, at least, and Mearsheimer, which is why their names have been mentioned. In my Mearsheimer call-out, I noted that yes, Trump did want to establish an American imperium, while saluting Dissident for getting that partially correct.

I also tweaked the header here to put "neocon" before "dove." But, in dealing with his backers, they self-sheepled because he encouraged the "dove" thoughts.

Further proof Zach is right, as am I? June 19's news is that Trump is now weathervaning again on Iran and talking about "two more weeks of negotiations."

Additional note: I have yet to write a full thought piece about The Dissident, but we're getting closer. The "307" in his handle is presumably NOT a reference to Wyoming's area code, but what is it? Also, while a lot of people aren't perfect spellers, he gets some bigger names wrong. For instance, he consistently spells Miriam Adelson with two D's. Something like that tells me that, while he's an anti-neocon pergressuve on foreign policy, and one who's well read, he's not an "insider." And, other than saying Dems hate the First Amendment, not a single piece on US domestic political issues, like climate change, national health care, etc.

The Texas Lege breaks the Texas Monthly

Texas Monthly has abandoned its traditional 10 best and 10 worst Legiscritters coverage, saying it just couldn't do it with today's Lege. 

Instead, it went with the nine lawmakers and one lobbyist who shaped the session. It's pretty much similar to a 10 worst list, but no accompanying 10 best.

That said, with Gene Wu as House Dems' leader, it's kind of hard to find a 10 best.

Brian Harrison is the Monthly's legislative "cockroach," far worse than a bum steer.

That said, it's arguable that Texas Monthly has broken itself in ways since Paul Burka handed off the 10 best/10 worst lists, and even more since his death.

Gene Wu versus Dustin Burrows, himself, his caucus and more

Gene Wu talks to the Observer about how the House got rolled.

There's several interesting takeaways from this.

First, he says it's less about Dustin Burrows being further right than McDade Phelan, but more about the political youth of most of his top lieutenants.

Related, he supports the Dem Caucus (largely) rallying behind Burrows, while snidely dismissing the question about whether or not Dems could have held out longer.

Second, on vouchers, and the possibility of them being put on the ballot, he thinks Trump's personal phone call flipped many Republicans.

Third, he says Burrows broke many promises, but then refuses to name them. He then refuses to compare Burrows to Phelan.

Gene, you threw Dustin under the bus; you might as well eat the whole enchilada.

I mean, you did sort of throw Strangeabbott under the bus:

I don’t think people were scared of Abbott as much as they were scared of Trump. … In this day and age, saying that legislation is something that Governor Abbott wants is a dangerous proposition.

And, will your refusal to do similar to Burrows lead to somebody else challenging you for Dem House leadership in two years?

Later, Wu gives the portion of his own caucus that voted for constitutional amendments to ban certain taxes a pass. Why? House leadership pressure really? Many of your bills weren't going to pass anyway.

Half the interview comes off like Wu getting self-rolled or rick-rolled, or something.