Philosopher friend Dan Kaufman surely would or will disagree
if or when he sees this, but I shall explain that header.
On Ludwig Wittgenstein, he does have a lot of insight, but, I don’t
ennoble him like Dan does. (Dan might object a bit to the word "ennoble," but ... I'll stand by its sentiment.)
In part, that’s because one can go “meta” on Wittgenstein’s
language games idea. I think Walter Kaufmann, with his somewhat contrarian rejection of “guilt” and “justice” as universals or quasi-universals kind of
gets at that.
But, there are other issues. And, expanding on a comment I left on a post at Massimo Pigliucci's blog, here are a few of them.
1. Are we talking about descriptive or prescriptive use of a
particular word, or words in general?
2. Can we even agree on what “prescriptive” and “descriptive” mean, either in general or with a particular word?
3. How do we make such judgments?
These are just a few of many ideas related to this issue.
In short, Wittgenstein’s idea on language games, in the real
world, must be run through …
Wait for it, those of you know one of my favorite
philosophers …
Wittgenstein must in some way be run through Ye Olde Philter
of Induction, courtesy David Hume.
Let’s start with the word “game.”
“Game” is not a Platonic Idea, or even close to it. It’s
not, per what I said about Kaufmann (two n’s, the professional interpreter of
Nietzsche), even a quasi-universal, if you agree with him. And, since I do on
“guilt” and “justice,” I certainly do on “game.”
Rather, we learn the idea of “game” from playing actual
individual games. No matter how much of a desire for at least physical play is
inborn, the idea of games, rather than unstructured play, is not at all a
universal.
We then learn about particular subconcepts associated with
games. Straight to Wittgenstein, these include rule making for games, rule
agreement for games, and more.
Actually, it’s a combination of rote-type learning and
social or associational learning, or discovery, or concept crafting.
I can illustrate this with a word better than, but somewhat
related to “game.”
Let’s talk about “sport,” and real issues kicked around by
American sports fans.
Is golf a “game,” or is it just a “competition”?
If golf is a “game,” what about billiards? What about chess?
Per many Olympics watchers, what about synchronized swimming? My particular
answers as a sports fan are yes, maybe and no. But, I know I have no rational
way of defending them. And, if I pressed Wittgenstein, were he alive and
talking to me, he probably wouldn’t either. He’d probably, at some point, in
fact, show his Continental philosophical roots, and look for a picture of Hume,
or one of his books, to destroy with a fireplace poker.
This is why Wittgenstein on language is not a Rand McNally
atlas. Rather, he’s more like a Mercator map. Not a Mercator projection, but an
actual Mercator map, by Mercator himself, which shows but rough outlines for
much of the world.
Beyond that, after the idea of Noam Chomsky, Steve Pinker
and others about massive brain modularity showed itself to not be totally true,
which in turn led to some degree of questioning of ideas like Chomsky’s deep
grammar and deep semantic structures, we have other reasons for saying that
Wittgenstein’s “A Game with Words” needs to be run through an empiricist,
induction-based filter.
3 comments:
First, pun intended, it's probably not my last word on the issue.
Second, I think it is somewhat related. If we agree on a definition of "game" that it must have at least a few rules, contra "play," then few animals engage in games.
Where does "simulation" fit? is the mindset to create a simulation necessarily conscious or not? That's one issue.
I can understand that. That said, especially in light of the thesis presented here, to me, it is more material, in that simulation, at least to me, and when used about carbon-based life and not computers, seems to imply some degree of consciousness aforethought.
Do wolves play roles? Or perhaps instead, "play roles"? Yes. But, per wolf intelligence, a comment on one essay by Massimo (not his comment) and other things, it is possible that a lot of that is unconscious, and not even unconscious within an individual wolf, but as pack animals, a social structure feedback.
Oh, Wittgenstein the man was interesting indeed, or "interesting," because he was tormented, as a good bio of him shows. So does the book "Wittgenstein's Poker," referencing one particular troubled incident in that life.
His ... beyond "noblesse oblige," even, like in his WWI service, his rural teaching despite obviously hating it, are also interesting. One wonders if he had an actual hair shirt, or a Penitente-style whip, in a closet somewhere.
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