If you really want to understand the world of oil and gas

Read this piece, "Nobody is Denied Energy," then this piece, "A Barrel of Crude is Not Just a Fuel," to understand how both hydrocarbons play out in the global economy, and what's likely ahead for the short-term future.

In terms of "shocks" on both fuelstocks, and the Cold War 2.0 that both US duopoly parties produce, and aim even more at China than Russia? In the short term, China is pretty insulated on both. In the longer term, it is increasing its insulation on oil with EV buildout. Its exposure on gas is primarily on gas as feedstock for foodstuffs, whether fertilizer, pesticide or herbicide. But, it's ongoing pivot to Brazil as food exporter versus the US gives it some degree of insulation from US-based gas shocks.

Here is my Substack comment on the first piece:

Well put all around, especially on the coda of China and EV build-out. Yeah, five years from now, the oil window will look differently there. And, per what I said elsewhere on gas issues and food, China is free to continue to import more foodstuffs from places like Brazil and less from the US.

And on the second:

Great stuff all around. And, on 1941, Roosevelt underlings, while he was hobnobbing with Churchill, were the ones who actually tightened the screws on Japan on aviation fuel, and by the time he found out, a couple of months of screw-tightening were deemed too much to reverse. 

On fracking, you know like I do that much of it the 2010s was financially underwater, ergo, contra American exceptionalists, oil division, did not disprove Hubbert's Peak. And, per the general theory behind Hubbert, the fracking portion of America's oil and gas both will get tighter in the future. How much tighter and how quickly, I don't know? 

Per your one linked piece, on "Fortress America" pivoting to Latin America? Still won't affect China in Cold War 2.0, right, and also, under the current American regime, will be the old Dual Monarchy's "hotbed of nationalities." This sets aside continuing Chinese efforts at increasing inroads in Latin America. Then there's the issue of how much more sharply Japan and South Korea eventually look at the American alliance, kind of like the smaller Gulf states today, and what they can actually do, or try to do, to slip it. (Shorter answer is: It all depends on how much more rapproachment they want with China, right?) Pakistan? Already a failing state (that's a continuum, not a single point) a few steps down the road in the wrong direction toward failed state.

Go read both, along with pieces linked off them.