In a post below, I talked a bit about wanting to change the U.S. electoral system. In response to one of the comments, I added some information there, and I’m going to talk more here about what I’d like to see changed.
First, as I mentioned there, I encourage everyone here who is interested in political science issues to read David Lazare’s “The Frozen Republic.” It is the best book I know advocating a parliamentary government for the U.S.
The first reason I cite is based on the analogy of the U.K. and other modern parliamentary democracies. You have an election, and the new government, if there is a change of parties, takes over the next day. If a coalition is needed, it takes over as soon as coalition details are in place. Opposition parties already have “shadow” cabinet secretaries, etc.
In a nuclear-armed, and computer-driven age, the U.S Constitution (the body, not the various civil liberties and rights) is antiquated in many ways. This is the most egregious way. It’s simply unacceptable for the world’s most-powerful (both militarily, and for a bit longer, at least — watch that Chinese shadow — economically) nation to have a transition of 10 weeks between governments, with another two-three weeks after that before a cabinet is in place.
The second way it’s antiquated is illustrated by the 2006 election. First, a change of Congress like this would have booted Bush out of power.
Related to that, especially if (per my discussion on voting changes, below), we had third parties holding seats (let’s say, Greens and maybe a Libertarian or two) and the Democrats’ margin was narrow, the Democratic party would have to actually deliver on getting out of Iraq. If not, deaths, resignations, by-elections (to use that wonderful British term), etc., would undercut Democrats’ power to govern without coalition.
Beyond going to a parliamentary system, I’m also ready to change specifics of those representatives.
First, in addition to the 435 single-member district Representatives (which we might change to call them “state-proportioned Representatives), let’s elect another, say, 165 off a national list, on a proportional basis. I’m directly using the German Bundestag, with a 400/200 split, as my starting point. Having a national list (with a lower cutoff percentage for third parties to qualify than in Germany) would give third parties a better chance of getting a couple of seats, at least.
Second, to eliminate the perpetual campaign, and tracking the norm in other states, Representatives would serve four-year terms. But, to make government even more responsive, we would stagger this to have half the House elected every two years. Or, to give a “mid-term” feel, we could have single-member districts on one four-year cycle and the national list on another.
Third, though I would not make the Senate as weak as the British House of Lords, since this is a parliamentary government, I would weaken it somewhat, a la the German Bundesrat, the Japanese Diet’s upper house, etc. And, to further reflect regionalism, versus single-state federalism, I would consider the idea of having some Senators elected on a regional basis; also, to lessen the small-state inequity of the Senate, regional Senators would be apportioned to different regions (South, Mid-Atlantic, New England, etc.) on a population basis.
States would also be allowed to have their Representatives elected by a method other than first-past-the-post single-member districts. The particular method for this would be of their choice.
Here are Wiki links for single transferable vote (a method I like more than what Clay proposes, but which would probably require change in federal law), preferential voting in general (which includes both IRV and the STV I like, and voting systems in general, including Clay’s range voting.
I favor the Single Transferable Vote system, myself.
A strong federal Congressional campaign finance law would also be passed, including money for third-party candidates meeting reasonable thresholds.
I would also eliminate the “life or good behavior” tenure in office of federal judges. District judges would serve 12-year terms, reappointable once. Appellate and Supreme Court justices would serve 14- and 16-year terms, respectively, also reappointable once. (Extra appointments could not be carried over from inferior to superior courts.)
Now, I’m not at all sanguine about ANY of this actually happening. But, you can now see how dissatisfied and disaffected I am with the current political process.
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September 23, 2007
Changing the U.S. voting and political system radically
Labels:
parliamentary democracy,
U.S. Constitution
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4 comments:
There are numerous problems here. First of all, IRV is STV. Specifically, it's the single-winner case of STV. Reweighted Range Voting is simpler and objectively better than STV (i.e. it is monotonic), and it degrades into the excellent Range Voting in the single-winner case. IRV is unsupportably poor by comparison. Therefore the RRV/RV combo seems to be a no brainer vs. STV/IRV.
Campaign finance laws certainly sound well intentioned, but seem infeasible, and potentially disastrous. First and formost, they operate by letting the government (comprised of party members with their own vested political interests) have a say in the economic affairs of potential opposition. Then there's the the question of what is fairly called campaign spending or isn't, which is largely open to interpretation (e.g. is it a political campaign if I endorse my favorite candidate on my blog?). Then there's the overarching issue of restricting an individual's freedom to spend his money however he darned well pleases. Then there's the fact that government funding (say for minor parties) would require taxation, meaning a public funding advocate like you would essentially be forcing me to spend my money to help some candidates I might not even support. That won't go over well with freedom lovers (and count me among them).
Here's another perspective, from RangeVoting.org co-founder (and Princeton math Ph.D.) Warren D. Smith:
"One of the quixotic ways in which we are trying to fight the battle is to control the amount of money which candidates have to campaign with. The idea is that if we cripple all candidates identically, then it will be more fair for all of them. What really happens is that all candidates are kept from competing with McDonald's, MTV, and Beverly Hills 90210 for the mindshare of the people – which partially explains the widespread voter apathy seen today."
But the use of Range Voting can plausibly decrease the importance of cash better, and infinitely more fairly, than all the campaign finance reform laws you could ever realistically get passed:
"Because of voters bound by the strategy dilemma, candidates realize that they have to convince people not only that they are right, but that they can win. Voters don't like wasting votes, and so candidates are forced to spend a lot of money on proving they can win rather than talking about the issues. This illusion of winnability is an expensive endeavor, and so only the candidates that gather a lot of money up front stand a chance."
But Range Voting makes it safe to always maximally support one's favorite candidate - not just one's favorite "electable" candidate, and so dramatically lessens the importance of having the large "war chest" that's required to prove electability. The same can't be true of rank-order methods, e.g. IRV - it incentivizes a strategy that causes it to effectively degrade into plurality voting (whereas Range Voting degrades into Approval Voting, which is still a great system).
One last note with regard to proportional representation. It seemed you advocated systems like the German one, which actively recognize party affiliation (i.e. party list systems). This is, I believe the evidence shows, a grave mistake. A good P.R. voting method is blind to stated party affiliations, and instead looks at ideological correlations in the eyes of the voters themselves - which has the added benefit of holding individual politicians personally accountable.
I would suggest you spend some time in the Yahoo RangeVoting discussion group, where you can find out more about the incredibly complex world of voting methods.
Regards,
Clay
I disagree with several things. First, I have read about multiple voting systems in the past; I stand by my contention that, depending on exactly how votes fall, ALL can have problems. That "ALL" includes range voting.
Second, while my reading on Wiki was somewhat skimming, it did refresh some of the basics of my previous knowledge on the subject.
Third, were I to be interested in a Yahoo Group on voting issues, I'd like to be in one that discussed all alternatives to our current system, not just one.
Fourth, PR plus a more parliamentary system would force stronger party stances on issues. You, in disparaging national lists, ignore that that is exactly the case in a country like Germany.
Fifth, gathering what I see as your likely opposition to even current presidential campaign finance funding, I'll gather you're either a small-l or capital-L libertarian. Beyond noting the "public good" arguments for campaign finance, I now wonder if range voting isn't some Libertarian pet project.
Warren Smith's comments are a massive non sequitur. Congressional campaign finance, especially if it has third-party provisions, aims to OPEN, not close, the playing field. That's part of why Congress opposes it.
His comments about the WHY of voter apathy have no empirical support for tracing that apathy to campaign finance.
And, with all of that in mind, I'll probably take further comments of yours with a bit more grain of salt.
I'm with you, Gadfly. Good analysis, and maybe we can win some of this stuff. It's been done in most other nations and more places in the USA...
Advocates of Range Voting and Instant Runoff Voting supporters agree that the current "plurality" voting method in use throughout the U.S. can be extremely undemocratic. Range Voting supporters, however, ignore a few very important points. Unlike Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), Range Voting is an unproven voting method that has no track record in real-world high stakes elections. The simple fact that Range Voting does not adhere to the principle of majority rule (a candidate that 80% of the voters consider to be the absolute best candidate can lose under Range Voting rules), means that it has no chance of ever being adopted in the U.S.
Another of Range Voting's biggest problems is the fact that it is so obvious how to manipulate an election using insincere strategic voting. Candidates and their supporters quickly realize that if a voter votes for an alternate choice, that may help defeat that voter's favorite candidate. For this reason, voters will tend to "bullet vote" for their favorite choice, and Range (and its cousin Approval) Voting quickly degenerates into simple plurality voting. This means that all of the theoretical niceties go out the window. Professor Nicolaus Tideman, a leading expert on voting methods, recently published a book ("Collective Decisions And Voting") that compares voting methods in terms of how susceptible they are to such insincere strategic voting. Range and Approval Voting rated very badly, while IRV was among the most immune to manipulation.
Political Scientists, who study voting methods, widely (though not universally) agree that Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is the preferred method to elect a single winner when there are more than two candidates. The American Political Science Association, for example, has adopted IRV to elect their own national president.
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