This month in philosophy: Rejecting old ideas on free will

For new readers, this is actually a roundup of my philosophy-related postings for January.

At the start of the year, I talked about New Year's resolutions, and how ideas behind the making of resolutions relates to issues of free will and consciousness. 

Next, I took a look at the philosophy of fallacies and fallacious reasoning, especially the "informal" fallacies that most people think about when they talk about this issue.

Back in December, I did a second installment on what is becoming a bit of a series: saying "Mu" to the old polarities, old dichotomies and old inadequate definitions of the increasingly stale and sterile "free will vs. determinism" debate. Thoughts here are inspired in part by David Hume and his "fleeting self" ideas, which supplements theories of the likes of Dan Dennett about subselves and multiple drafts of consciousness.

I followed that at the end of January with Part 3, which focuses on problems I see with compatibilist ideas of free will. As often is the case when I write on these issues, there's usually an allusion to Dennett. That's especially here, since this is his modern baby. But, he's just as wrong on a lot of issues of free will as on a lot of issues of consciousness.