tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post113051304009337391..comments2024-03-13T13:29:33.800-05:00Comments on SocraticGadfly: Ranked Choice Voting — should Greens embrace it or be concerned?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-6099098750345680882016-12-25T20:18:02.627-06:002016-12-25T20:18:02.627-06:00Wow,a mass of contradictions.
I say that I care a...Wow,a mass of contradictions.<br /><br />I say that I care about centrist vs. non-centrist. I'm told not to care about that, yet told to care about my satisfaction?<br /><br />I otherwise disagree with you and Aaron.<br /><br />And, I'll stand by Wiki, and others, rather than you.<br /><br />I already noted I'm no pilgrim. I first wrote about FPTP alternatives 9 years ago. And, already back then, some of you approval voting folks came off as semi-cultist.<br /><br />That too will be on my next post.<br /><br />As I said was likely, comments on this are closed for now. (And just because I don't address other things doesn't mean I think you're right on them.)Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-64125188628480561192016-12-25T19:55:52.793-06:002016-12-25T19:55:52.793-06:00> I'll take Wikipedia's statements and ...> I'll take Wikipedia's statements and observations over yours. <br /><br />Wikipedia's information on voting methods is actually generally inferior to the state of the art as discovered by Warren Smith and some others of his ilk, such as Forest Simmons. Particularly its treatment of tactical voting makes the very fallacy I highlight in the graph on <a href="http://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/tactical-voting" rel="nofollow">this page</a>.<br /><br />To give a few concrete examples, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_voting#Range_voting" rel="nofollow">Wikipedia entry on tactical Score Voting says</a>:<br /><br />>This presents an additional problem as compared to the approval system if some voters give honest "weak" votes with middle rankings and other voters give strategic approval votes.<br /><br />Simply false. Score Voting <a href="http://scorevoting.net/ShExpRes.html" rel="nofollow">outperforms Approval Voting</a> with any mixture of strategic or honest voters. This should be obvious, since Approval Voting <i>forces</i> a distortion of sincere preferences.<br /><br />> A different path to minimize this problem is to use median scores instead of total scores, as median scores are less amenable to exaggeration, as in majority judgment.<br /><br />Utterly false. MJ is subject to the same strategy, which can produce <a href="http://scorevoting.net/MedianVrange" rel="nofollow">more severe problems</a>. It also produces significant information loss for sincere ballots.<br /><br />> Wikipedia was clearly talking about systems for political elections, re tactical voting.<br /><br />The Wikipedia entry I referenced is wrong, regardless of what whether we're talking about voting for politicians or names for pet rocks.<br /><br />> I'll add that "utilitarian winners," specifically as for what's most utilitarian, are in the eye of the beholder.<br /><br />Simply false. You can objectively measure the utility efficiency of a voting method. Some methods will make you statistically more satisfied with election results than others.<br /><br />> I already told Aaron that approval voting's tendency to elect moderate candidates is a specific fault in this beholder's eye.<br /><br />You shouldn't care about centrist or non-centrist. You should care about your satisfaction with election outcomes. Expected utility.Clayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03298172406046363291noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-21345446015708949812016-12-25T16:40:01.267-06:002016-12-25T16:40:01.267-06:00Wikipedia was clearly talking about systems for po...Wikipedia was clearly talking about systems for political elections, re tactical voting. And, on the issue of majoritarian voting ... well, that's a new version of giving lip service to approval voting having the same faults as others, but then sweeping it under the rug. <br /><br />I'll add that "utilitarian winners," specifically as for what's most utilitarian, are in the eye of the beholder. I already told Aaron that approval voting's tendency to elect moderate candidates is a specific fault in this beholder's eye.<br /><br />You got one comment left, and then, for now at least, I'll be closing comments here.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-44031122980960963042016-12-25T16:36:30.907-06:002016-12-25T16:36:30.907-06:00This comment has been removed by the author.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-56012288593052867672016-12-25T16:27:10.075-06:002016-12-25T16:27:10.075-06:00> 1. That NO alternative system can guarantee a...> 1. That NO alternative system can guarantee a majority winner and<br /><br />Or to be even more accurate, there's <a href="https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/utilitarian-majoritarian" rel="nofollow">no such thing</a> as a "majority winner".<br /><br />And even when there's an unambiguous majority winner, that's not even necessarily the best option.<br />http://scorevoting.net/CondorcetCycles.html<br />http://scorevoting.net/XYvote.html<br /><br />> 2. That ALL alternatives are subject to tactical voting<br /><br />False. I know of three systems that are completely immune from tactical voting, though they all include randomness and are thus not well suited to political elections.<br /><br />In any case, I have <a href="http://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/tactical-voting" rel="nofollow">a lot to say</a> about tactical voting.Clayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03298172406046363291noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-91966931640476025482016-12-25T16:12:04.603-06:002016-12-25T16:12:04.603-06:00I never said Fair Vote was perfect, and will look ...I never said Fair Vote was perfect, and will look at your links. I did already say that I knew its oars were primarily in the water for IRV.<br /><br />I've only mildly expressed my thoughts on Bayesian "anything." I consider Bayesian anythings to often be "stretched." I've already written extensively on this site about Bayesian probabilities and Jesus mythicism. And, when I do a second post, which I will, I'll be sure to make further reference to that issue.<br /><br />And, approval voting? I've thought of one way in which it might be more confusing for voters than many of its touters think.<br /><br />As for other possible refutations of Fair Vote, or other sites that present issues with score voting, or approval voting, I'll continue to look at neutral sites. I've already referenced Wikipedia's take on various alternative voting issues. And, its two basic issues:<br />1. That NO alternative system can guarantee a majority winner and<br />2. That ALL alternatives are subject to tactical voting<br />Will top that next blog post, too.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-64880683074463702452016-12-25T14:12:14.982-06:002016-12-25T14:12:14.982-06:00> approval voting has no guarantee of improving...> approval voting has no guarantee of improving third party visibility vs. any other alternative voting system to FPTP. None. <br /><br />This is simply false, as I demonstrate in the video. Systems like Score Voting and Approval Voting, which produce a total sum for each candidate, allow a simple comparison of the relative strength of every candidate. Whereas Instant Runoff Voting for example provides no such metric.<br /><br />Additionally, Score Voting and Approval Voting satisfy the Favorite Betrayal Criterion, so it's never strategic to NOT vote for your favorite candidate. The general strategy with ranked systems is to bury your favorite if she's unlikely to win, causing an exaggeration in the weakness of already weak candidates. Warren Smith has called this the "nursery effect".<br /><br />http://scorevoting.net/NurserySumm.html<br /><br />> that's not really even an empirical statement; it's opinion.<br /><br />I just cited empirical evidence for it.<br /><br />> http://www.fairvote.org/why-approval-voting-is-unworkable-in-contested-elections<br /><br />Essentially every claim in that piece is rigorously refuted, e.g. <a href="http://scorevoting.net/RichieRV.html" rel="nofollow">here</a>.<br /><br />> Fair Vote argues that Range Voting could have seen Goldwater defeat LBJ.<br /><br />FairVote is known to <a href="https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/fact-check" rel="nofollow">regularly make deceptive and false statements</a>.<br /><br />> this page from a Google Group, in which I notice Craig is a contributor, does have people voice concerns about the utility of Bayesian Regret, etc. https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/LUzDXlZxceM<br /><br />That thread strongly supports the robustness of Warren Smith's Bayesian Regret figures, even when you consider the mild "criticisms". Warren says there:<br /><br />"as an abstract concept/framework, I think [Bayesian Regret] doesn't really have any weaknesses, it's just "the right approach." The difficulties arise when you try to convert the concept into practice; i.e. whenever you develop a computer program it has various ingredients like voter behavior models etc which can always be criticized. BR with the right voter behavior model (& etc "knobs") is (I think) clearly the right thing to do -- but that doesn't mean we know what that right model is. <b>Fortunately in the single-winner case it seems not to matter much what these "knob settings" are.</b> [I.e. Score Voting beats all other "non-exotic" systems regardless of any of the knob settings.] If conclusions had been very sensitive to that, then BR would have been a lot less useful."Clayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03298172406046363291noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-15854157854958266112016-12-25T11:27:24.953-06:002016-12-25T11:27:24.953-06:00Finally, speaking of the "Burlington problem,...Finally, speaking of the "Burlington problem," Fair Vote argues that Range Voting could have seen Goldwater defeat LBJ.<br /><br />http://archive.fairvote.org/rangevoting.pdf<br /><br />Look, touters of approval or range voting — it's been a while since I've done much swimming in these waters. But, I have done a few bits of such swimming before, and I'm not a pilgrim. Before I, or others, comment further, and as I consider a follow-up post, I just wanted to throw that out there now.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-45095610561558700152016-12-25T11:24:32.524-06:002016-12-25T11:24:32.524-06:00And Fair Vote (yes, I know its oars row mainly in ...And Fair Vote (yes, I know its oars row mainly in IRV) comments on problems with multiple other systems: http://www.fairvote.org/why-approval-voting-is-unworkable-in-contested-electionsGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-74231550091674757822016-12-25T11:21:56.833-06:002016-12-25T11:21:56.833-06:00And, this page from a Google Group, in which I not...And, this page from a Google Group, in which I notice Craig is a contributor, does have people voice concerns about the utility of Bayesian Regret, etc. https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/electionscience/LUzDXlZxceM<br /><br />To which, I'll add two other things. <br /><br />One, relying on a 2000 computer simulation where the biggest simulation had just 200 voters isn't that statistically strong.<br /><br />Second, per other observations I've made about some approval voting touters, the fact that most the first page of Google returns is devoted to range voters' and approval voters' touting of Bayesian regret for their desired voting system, rather than, say, a Wikipedia article, etc., is itself interesting. <br /><br />Speaking of, via the Free Dictionary, here's what Wiki has to say about BR, and not just limited to alternative voting systems. IMO, it does give at least some credence to some of the alternative voices on that Google Group: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Bayesian+regretGadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-12861266490299942832016-12-25T10:59:11.829-06:002016-12-25T10:59:11.829-06:00Oh, and I'll see if I can find something on Ba...Oh, and I'll see if I can find something on Bayesian Regret that's not on a site dedicated to approval voting and similar.Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-76930824456374424782016-12-25T10:57:45.631-06:002016-12-25T10:57:45.631-06:00I've already sadi, under logistical concerns, ...I've already sadi, under logistical concerns, that I agree on ease of voting machine configuration. Related issues, I would also agree.<br /><br />I'll take a look at the Bayesian Regret.<br /><br />That said, I question or reject your other claims.<br /><br />First, approval voting has no guarantee of improving third party visibility vs. any other alternative voting system to FPTP. None. Indeed, that's not really even an empirical statement; it's opinion.<br /><br />Second, as already noted, <b>NO alternative to FPTP can guarantee a majority winner.</b> That includes approval voting. I've seen approval voting enthusiasts give lip service tot that, then ignore it.<br /><br />A corollary to that is the one I've already stated: If approval voting is adopted enough, it WILL have its own "Burlington moment."Gadflyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13075757287807731373noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7532871.post-5215644407486319882016-12-25T10:42:58.853-06:002016-12-25T10:42:58.853-06:00> I need ConservaGreens no more than I need Con...> I need ConservaGreens no more than I need ConservaDems.<br /><br />You need "the highest possible expected utility". Approval Voting is markedly superior to Instant Runoff Voting as measured by Bayesian Regret.<br /><br />http://ScoreVoting.net/BayRegsFig.html<br /><br />Not to mention superior for third party visibility/viability and a host of logistical concerns.<br /><br />https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2q_eMUGCU5UClayhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03298172406046363291noreply@blogger.com